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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL COLLABORATION IN
THE GOVERNMENT AND NONPROFIT SECTORS

The primary objective of this dissertation is to study the management of public
and nonprofit resources and financial risk. Governments will be able to use its findings to
continue to provide public services in collaboration with other sectors, including the
nonprofit sector. Nonprofit financial self-sufficiency and sub-award grant mechanisms
between the government and nonprofit sectors are two primary areas to be examined.
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first investigates how the diversification of
nonprofit revenue portfolios influences extreme revenue risks; the results show that the
chance of extreme revenue loss increases when revenue sources are highly correlated to
each other. The second essay examines the impact of strenuous state fiscal conditions on
nonprofit organizations based in different U.S. states in order to report on generalizable
empirical research on sub-award grant mechanisms, state and local government grants
awarded to nonprofit organizations. The third essay explores the nonprofit sector’s
response to economic shocks, and whether specific state characteristics intensified or
mitigated the impact of the economic crisis. The findings from this dissertation can help
nonprofit-sector scholars and practitioners understand different perspectives of market
risk, revenue risk and portfolio development, and financial stability related to government
grants.
KEYWORDS: Nonprofit Finance, Nonprofit Risk Management, Inter-organizational
Financial Security, Nonprofit Financial Security
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Executive Summary

This dissertation consists of three essays related to nonprofit risk management,
determinants of state grants, and economic crisis management. The findings from this
dissertation can help nonprofit-sector researchers and managers understand different
perspectives of (1) market risk, (2) revenue risk and portfolio development, and (3)
financial stability related to government grants.
The first essay— Nonprofit Revenue Strategy and Downside Risk: Applying
Portfolio Theory and Extreme Value Theory—investigates how the diversification of
nonprofit revenues influences revenue risks. Traditionally, the coefficient of variation
(CV) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) have been used to measure revenue
volatility risk and diversification, respectively. Because such measures may not be
appropriate for all nonprofit organizations, this paper considers alternative measures: the
value-at-risk (VaR, a measure of downside risk) and the portfolio variance index as a
measure of portfolio diversification.
The second essay— The Influences of Budgetary Size on State and Federal
Government Grant Contributions between 2000 and 2011—discusses the impact of
strenuous state fiscal condition on nonprofit organizations in the states. Government
grants have been an important financial source for nonprofit organizations that can
provide public services. However, there are few studies that have discussed the impact of
the state governments’ expenditures on their grant contributions on nonprofits. I thus
estimate whether nonprofits receive more from state and local governments if state
governments spend more on general public services.
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The third essay— Coping with Economic Crisis: The Buffering Capacity of U.S.
States for the Nonprofit Sector—explores the nonprofit sector’s response to economic
shocks and whether state characteristics intensified or mitigated the influence of the
economic crisis. Economic crises have repeatedly occurred in the history of economies.
Dealing successfully with unexpected external shocks is crucial to the survival of the
nonprofit sector. Since few studies have examined the effects of an economic crisis on
the nonprofit sector compared to studies on the for-profit and governmental sectors, this
study can empirically contribute the market risk management and explain the unique
characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of responding to an economic crisis.
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Chapter One. Introduction to Nonprofit Finance and Revenues
In the United States, a “charitable nonprofit organization” refers to an entity that
is eligible for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In
2016, more than a million charitable nonprofits were in operation among the total of 1.5
million tax-exempt organizations, including 105,030 private foundations and 368,337
chambers of commerce, fraternal organizations, and civic leagues. To receive tax-exempt
benefits, this type of charitable organization must be organized and operated to
exclusively pursue its charitable mission rather than pursuing the interests of any one
private shareholder or individual. These organizations’ activities vary among
communities and include caring for veterans, rebuilding cities, educating children,
supporting the workforce, nursing the sick, supporting the elderly, elevating the arts,
mentoring the youth, and protecting natural resources, among other missions.
This type of charitable nonprofit has several restrictions. If the organization
transfers excessive benefits to someone who has substantial influence over the
organization, then the person or the organization may have to pay an excise tax and risk
the loss of tax-exempt status. In addition, organizations may not be involved in political
and lobbying activities in which they attempt to influence legislation or specific political
candidates’ campaigns.
The central justification for tax-exempt status and for the limiting of nonprofits’
political activities is that these organizations provide public services to confer benefits to
the community or to relieve burdens that the government would otherwise need to
provide. In addition, tax exemption can be thought of as a kind of subsidy in which the
government confers a benefit to nonprofits so that they may continue to produce positive
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social value. The underlying assumption in this scenario is that, ideally, the social value
of the public services the exempt organization provides will be equal to or greater than
the amount of revenue loss caused by the tax exemption of these charitable organizations
(Diamond, 2002). It may actually be more efficient to provide tax exemption to
nonprofits than to provide services supported by public expenditure, which requires
additional administration costs (Diamond, 2002). Since government support for
nonprofits through tax exemptions is similar to an indirect subsidy, the financial
sustainability of nonprofit organizations is an important consideration so that such
organizations can continue to provide services on behalf of the government or to
complement the government’s provision of services.
Nonprofit Finance and Revenue Sources
The nonprofit sector is a significant part of the U.S. economy. According to the
Urban Institute (2017), in 2013, nonprofits employed more than 14.4 million workers
(10.6% of the workforce) and contributed $634 billion in wages and salaries, which
represented 8.9% of all wages and salaries paid in the United States that year. Nonprofits
also earn their revenues from a variety of sources. In 2013, for example, public charities
reported over $1.74 trillion in total revenues and $1.63 trillion in total expenses. Of the
revenue, 21% was from contributions, gifts, and government grants; 72% was from
program service revenues, including government fees and contracts; and 7% was from
other sources, including dues, rental income, special event income, and gains or losses
from goods sold.
Nonprofit financial strategy and revenue management are important
considerations, since nonprofits have different financial perspectives compared to for-
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profit organizations. First, the main difference between for-profit and nonprofit firms is
that the ownership of nonprofits belongs to donors, as opposed to the autonomous
ownership of for-profit firms (Bowman, 2002). Because of this ownership situation, forprofit firms must maximize their profits, to be distributed to their anonymous individual
investors. Nonprofit firms, in contrast, do not face pressure to create profits but instead
have restrictions on asset utilization. For instance, the assets must be used to pursue the
social benefits that the firm’s donors have supported. In other words, the assets cannot be
invested to maximize on their return, which restricts the nonprofit revenue finance
strategy. It is therefore important to apply advanced corporate finance strategies with
caution, since the nonprofit sector has come to compete more and more with the private
sector, which has used advanced finance and risk management strategies for many years.
Second, the source of external revenue support (such as from the government) can
affect the stability of nonprofit operations. Although government grants represent the
second largest revenue sources for nonprofits, that revenue can depend on the financial
stability of different levels of government. For instance, governments at all levels of the
U.S. government paid $130 billion to U.S. nonprofits for services in 2014, but these
government bodies did not pay the full costs of the services performed; more than half of
nonprofits actually reported that the government had reimbursed them for less than 10
percent of their organizational costs (National Council of Nonprofits, 2017). The
government was also late in providing much of this reimbursement. Of nonprofits that
provided programs and services to different government bodies in 2014, around onequarter found that the federal government had paid more than 30 days late. The problem
was even more serious at the state and local levels, where late government payments
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affected approximately 30–35 percent of nonprofit contractors (National Council of
Nonprofits, 2017). Even though government support is generally known to be a stable
and secure source of revenue for nonprofits, such underpayment or late payment can
place nonprofits in financially difficult conditions (Beam and Conlan, 2002). For these
reasons, studying changes in government grants awarded to nonprofits can provide useful
information; in addition, since government grants are becoming a more significant part of
nonprofits’ revenues in terms of maintaining financial security and mission-oriented
objectives, an exploration of the understudied topic of government grants awarded to
nonprofits is in order.
Finally, the ability to successfully manage unexpected external shocks is crucial
to the survival of the nonprofit sector. Economic crises have occurred repeatedly
throughout the history of economics. Because few studies have examined the effects of
an economic crisis on the nonprofit sector (compared to the number of studies that have
been conducted on the public and private sectors), an examination of market risk
management will help to explain the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in
terms of its response to an economic crisis.
Dissertation Chapters
The first essay, “Nonprofit Revenue Strategy and Downside Risk: Applying
Portfolio Theory and Extreme Value Theory,” investigates how the diversification of
nonprofit revenue portfolios influences extreme revenue risks. Traditionally, economists
have used the coefficient of variation and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to measure
revenue volatility risk and diversification, respectively. As a result, having well-balanced
portfolios with balanced assets is crucial for organizations to be able to adjust to
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continuous volatility. The portfolio should have an appropriate number of revenue
sources with a smaller correlation of revenue sources that will reduce portfolio volatility.
The second essay, “The Influences of Budgetary Size on State and Federal
Government Grant Contributions between 2000 and 2011,” discusses the impact of
strenuous state fiscal conditions on nonprofit organizations in various states. Government
grants are a significant financial supporter of nonprofit organizations that enable them to
provide sufficient public services. Because few studies have discussed the impact of state
government grant contribution expenditures on nonprofits, this essay will explore the
determinants of state and local government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations in
order to provide generalizable empirical research on sub-award grant mechanisms.
The third essay, “Coping with Economic Crisis: The Buffering Capacity of U.S.
States for the Nonprofit Sector,” explores the nonprofit sector’s response to economic
shocks and whether state characteristics intensified or mitigated the impact of the recent
economic crisis. Economic crises have recurred throughout history, so the ability to
successfully handle unexpected external shocks is crucial to the survival of the nonprofit
sector. Few studies have examined the effects of economic crises on the nonprofit sector
compared to the number of previous studies on the public and private sectors. This study
can empirically contribute to the literature on market risk management and can explain
the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of its response to an economic
crisis.
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Chapter Two. Nonprofit Revenue Strategy and Downside Risk: Applying Portfolio
Theory and Extreme Value Theory

Many nonprofits can be forced to shut down in very short time periods if they lose
large donations or experience sudden changes in major revenue. Extreme value theory
(EVT) models and measures the likelihood of such rare, extreme events of large
magnitude. The theory is widely used to solve risk management problems in many fields,
especially finance and stock investment (Alves & Neves, 2016; Choudhry & Wong,
2013). Such extreme value studies can be critical because managers can prepare for onetime extreme shocks that can significantly affect organizations, even jeopardizing their
survival. For instance, the bottom 90% of charitable nonprofits that filed Form 990
earned roughly $21 million on average in 2012, whereas the top 10% earned $609 million
in revenue (IRS, 2015). The majority of small nonprofits may not be able to survive
extreme revenue loss unless they understand their potential risks and have proper risk
management directions in place, such as through a portfolio revenue strategy. Classifying
revenue risks and investigating whether nonprofit organizations can mitigate the
downside risk through different revenue strategies are both worthwhile endeavors.
This study expands upon previous research by exploring how the nonprofit
revenue strategy influences revenue risk. Revenue risk implies both downside risk and
deviation risk. Most studies on revenue risk focus on mean deviation risk, which is
measured by the standard deviation. The major problem with the use of standard
deviation is that it focuses on estimating the risk of deviation from the average. Nonprofit
managers may find it easier to address small increases or decreases from the average
annual revenue, compared to significant declines in revenue. However, managers are
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often concerned with large, unexpected losses (i.e., downside risk) since these extreme
revenue losses can happen more frequently than what one expects and cause serious
damage to the revenue of nonprofits. The chapter considers an alternative measure of
risk: value-at-risk as a measure of downside risk. This approach is helpful in estimating
the unexpected losses that nonprofits ultimately wish to minimize.
For revenue strategy, I also consider alternative measures—portfolio variance for
the portfolio revenue strategy measure—to compensate for the limitations of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) method, which focuses solely on the number of
revenue sources and the equal distribution of those sources. I conclude in this chapter that
portfolio revenue strategy, rather than revenue diversification, can decrease both
downside risk and deviation risk. Other factors, such as financial flexibility and the
growth potential of nonprofits, have different influences on downside risk and deviation
risk.
This study, therefore, investigates how the nonprofit revenue strategy influences
financial risks. Traditionally, the coefficient of variation (CV) and Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) have been used to measure revenue volatility risk and diversification,
respectively. Because such measures may not be appropriate for all nonprofit
organizations, this chapter considers alternative measures: value-at-risk (a measure of
downside risk) and the portfolio variance index as a measure of portfolio revenue
strategy. The models employ a fixed-effects regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K)
standard errors and test multiple observations of service fields based on the National
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) over a period of five years, from 2008 to 2012.
The results indicate that portfolio revenue strategy can reduce the downside risk and
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stabilize revenue inflow. Financial flexibility and growth potential all have different
impacts on downside and deviation risk. This study adds to the current literature by
contributing a different perspective of revenue risk and diversification to nonprofit
researchers and managers.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 offers a brief introduction to EVT,
summarizes the concept of the coefficient of variation (CV) in juxtaposition to the
concept of value-at-risk, and provides the conceptual framework of Markowitz’s
portfolio variance model. Section 2 introduces the hypotheses along with previous
studies. Section 3 discusses the data and econometrics models that are applied in this
study. Finally, sections 4, 5, and 6 present the statistical results and their implications for
the nonprofit finance and risk management fields.
Theoretical Background
Extreme value theory (EVT)
EVT examines periods of extreme events that represent the discontinuity of
normal periods. During some periods, for example, much larger changes will occur than
those predicted by the normal distribution, where the market exhibits relatively modest
changes in prices and returns. This theory has been developed and applied in various
fields, including insurance, financial markets, natural disasters, weather, and pollution
studies, where the analysis of extreme outliers is particularly important (Alves & Neves,
2016; Choudhry & Wong, 2013; Porter, 2007; Reiss, 2007). For example, the theory has
been used to model extremely high temperatures or to evaluate the impact of earthquakes
in different regions (Brown & Katz, 1995; Suzuki & Ozaka, 1994).
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In the financial world, EVT has become more critical following the financial
collapse of 2007–2008 as well as the 1987 stock market crash, often called Black
Monday (Alves & Neves, 2016). Both financial crises significant impacted enough the
market that they are difficult to categorize as normal market behavior. Specifically, the
stock market return dropped around 23% in a single day on October 19, 1987, and by
9.5% on October 15, 2008.
Empirically speaking, EVT is associated with “fat-tailed” behavior, which implies
the extreme risks inherent in finance. In other words, these extreme events might happen
only rarely, but their impact can be larger than under normal, stable conditions, where
clustering around the center of the normal probability distribution is more common
(Kemp, 2011). For the most part, conservative investors prefer to avoid (or to prepare for)
such unexpected outlier events, especially negative values in the left tail.
Revenue risk: Deviation risk and downside risk
Limitations of the coefficient of variation (CV). While CV is a useful tool for
measuring financial volatility, it does have limitations. First, the measure presents
deviation risk, which includes both upside and downside risk, and not specifically the latter.
In financial risk management, the term “risk” refers to “a loss or an injury created by an
activity” (Tarantino & Cernauskas, 2010, p. 2) and typically assumes the negative
consequences of risk. CV essentially shows how the large majority of the actual revenue
deviates above and below the mean (upside and downside risk). From a practical point of
view, nonprofit managers are usually more concerned with excessive losses that occur with
less frequency but have dire consequences for their organization.
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Second, the use of CV as a volatility measure might be inaccurate in the case of
skewed or leptokurtic (thick-tailed) non-normal distributions. The central limit theorem
holds that the shape of the tail in a normal distribution is symmetric on both sides of the
mean, which implies that the data are equally distributed around the middle.
Unfortunately, the distribution of many nonprofits’ revenue is leptokurtic, with tails
thicker than a normal probability distribution. This situation means that large fluctuations
occur more frequently and with higher and lower values compared to normal
distributions. Asymmetry also implies that CV can understate or overstate the downside
risk since CV averages deviation risk in both directions. CV thus may be a misleading
measure of revenue risk for nonprofits that wish to minimize their downside risk.
Value-at-risk: Downside risk estimation. To measure the downside risk and
overcome the limitation of the normal distribution, this chapter applies the concept of
value-at-risk. The value-at-risk framework is widely used to measure and quantify losses
that occur in the lower tail of a probability distribution, i.e., downside risk (Butler &
Schachter, 1996). More specifically, value-at-risk answers the question of how much one
expects to lose with a given probability—typically 1% or less. Value-at-risk provides the
threshold value of the potential loss that is expected to be greater than the value-at-risk
amount for a given probability. For example, if 1% of the value-at-risk on an asset equals
a revenue decrease of 40%, then revenue declines of 40% or more are expected to happen
in only 1% of all cases.
In mathematical terms, value-at-risk is based on the percentile point function
(𝑝𝑝𝑓(𝑝)) (or the quantile function), which is the inverse of the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) (𝐹(𝑋)). Specifically, CDF provides the probability of obtaining the
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random variable X less than or equal to the given value x (or the proportion of the
population with a value less than x). The ppf provides the threshold value of random
variable x at a given probability, such as inverting x and y for the CDF (Haslwanter,
2016; Shaw, 2007; Stover, 2017). Value-at-risk is defined as follows:

𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑋) = inf{𝑥: 𝑃(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥) ≥ α}

(1)

where X is the random variable describing the value of the loss of a portfolio, and
α*100% (0 < α < 1) is a specific percentage that selects a sample of the worst cases for
the portfolio to be analyzed (Acerbi & Tasche, 2002; Cade & Noon, 2003; Davino,
Furno, & Vistocco 2014; Hosking & Wallis, 1987; Jorion, 2001; Teasdale, Kerlin,
Young, & Soh, 2013). The quantile α is usually a small probability, such as .05, .01,
or .001 (respectively, 5%, 1%, and 0.1%). This study, like many previous studies, will
use the probability of 1%, which means that the events happen in the lowest 1% of the
distribution (the first percentile).
The qualitative benefits of EVT in the corporate sector are many, and yet, EVT
theory and value-at-risk have not yet been actively applied to nonprofit finance. Despite
the potential benefits of EVT to the nonprofit sector, the calculation of value-at-risk often
requires ample data to generate the probability distribution of the downside tail.
Corporate financial data are frequently collected in daily or weekly intervals, making it
possible to find a value-at-risk specific to each firm. However, nonprofit finance data are
reported on annual bases, which makes it difficult for researchers or risk managers to
generate the probability distribution and calculate the value-at-risk. Alternatively, a
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portfolio approach may be taken using pooled data from firms that share common
attributes or characteristics (such as the healthcare sector). The value-at-risk of the
subsector can be calculated based on the distribution of losses among organizations for
given years. This approach has been often used in corporate finance literature to compare
the individual firm to the industry, so that the individual firms can compare themselves to
their peer organizations or competitors. I employ this subsector approach to the nonprofit
subsectors.
Table 1 illustrates the difference between the concepts of value-at-risk and CV in
the context of the nonprofit subsectors. In the subsector of Arts, Culture, and Humanities,
the value-at-risk is -0.81 for the average of years 2008–2012. This means that the average
five-year revenue decline for the Arts subsector was equal to or less than -0.81 for 1% of
the organizations in that subsector. Another way to say this is that revenue growth
exceeded -0.81 for 99% of the organizations in the Arts subsector. The Environmental
subsector provides an apt comparison. The value-at-risk for the Environmental subsector
is larger than that for the Arts subsector, indicating that the Environmental sector has
more downside risk. Specifically, 1% of the organizations in the Environmental subsector
experienced revenue decline greater than or equal to 90%. What makes this comparison
interesting is that by the CV measure, the Arts subsector has more dispersion of risk than
the Environmental subsector. How is it that CV and value-at-risk produce seemingly
contradictory results? The average and standard deviation are influenced by outliers, and
the value-at-risk depends on the thickness of the tail. The Animal-related subsector is an
example of relatively low financial risk, as indicated by both measures.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Total Revenue by Sector (Total Revenue; $, %Δ; Average
2008-2012)
Value
NTEE
Description
Code
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V

Arts, Culture, &
Humanities
Education
Environment
Animal-Related

Total
revenue ($)

Volatility
Total
revenue
(%Δ)

Coefficient
Value-atof
risk
variation
(1%; %Δ)
($)

25,300,000

468.74

-0.81

5.91

85,300,000
22,600,000
21,300,000

7.36
2.71
0.22

-0.71
-0.90
-0.67

3.65
3.50
1.75

12.42
Health Care
197,000,000
Mental Health & Crisis
24,700,000
0.36
Intervention
Disease, Disorders, &
48,300,000
0.47
Medical Disciplines
77,300,000
0.54
Medical Research
16,800,000
0.29
Crime & Legal-Related
27,000,000
0.12
Employment
Food, Agriculture, &
24,500,000
0.11
Nutrition
6,370,311 1,163.37
Housing & Shelter
Public Safety, Disaster
7,686,838
0.26
Preparedness, & Relief
15,400,000
0.30
Recreation & Sports
10,100,000
0.27
Youth Development
26,000,000
5.52
Human Services
International, Foreign
Affairs, & National
96,100,000
4.64
Security
Civil Rights, Social
30,200,000
Action, & Advocacy
2,579.77
Community Improvement
15,200,000
7.91
& Capacity Building
Philanthropy, Voluntarism,
& Grant-Making
34,200,000
30.96
Foundations

-0.69

3.71

-0.59

2.24

-0.65

2.77

-0.80
-0.72
-0.61

3.00
2.67
2.75

-0.65

3.95

-0.86

3.76

-0.83

2.32

-0.59
-0.72
-0.63

6.73
2.91
3.65

-0.90

2.09

-0.72

2.10

-0.82

3.96

-0.92

3.47

1.10

-0.81

3.64

0.21

-0.54

1.79

Science & Technology
Social Science

137,000,000
39,500,000
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Table 1 (continued) Summary Statistics of Total Revenue by Sector (Total Revenue;
$, %Δ; Average 2008-2012)
W

Public & Societal Benefit

41,500,000

X

Religion-Related
Mutual & Membership
Benefit

15,400,000

3,758.98
0.43

71,700,000
44,658,286

Y
Average

-0.85

3.08

-0.86

2.65

3.46

-0.83

6.31

322.02

-0.75

3.37

Nonprofit Revenue Strategy: Revenue equalization and portfolio diversification
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI was originally developed to
quantify the competition of different industrial sectors (Herfindahl, 1951). Many scholars
from the nonprofit sectors use HHI calculations to measure how concentrated or evenly
distributed a nonprofit’s revenue sources are (Carroll & Stater 2009; Frumkin & Keating,
2011), which I will refer to this revenue diversification measured by HHI as “revenue
equalization.” Previous studies have used normalized HHI to measure diversification as
follows:

𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 =

2
(1−∑𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 )
1−1⁄𝑛

,

(2)

where 𝑅𝑖 is the proportion of donations, earned revenue, and investment income, and 𝑛 is
the number of revenue sources. This formulation ranges from 0 to 1, with a value closer to
1 representing a more equal distribution among revenues, whereas 0 implies a perfect
concentration. When a nonprofit has a higher number of revenue sources and equal
distribution across those sources, its normalized HHI value will range from zero to one.
Even though the HHI is a widely used measurement tool in the nonprofit finance
sector, it may be misleading in terms of measuring revenue diversification. For instance,
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some nonprofits are more highly dependent on revenue sources such as donative income
than on commercial or investment income because of their organizational characteristics
or charitable missions. But this revenue concentration automatically leads to a low HHI
index, which implies that the nonprofit carries a low diversification level and high
financial risk even what might not be true. In addition, the HHI method disregards the
cross-correlation among revenues when measuring portfolio diversification, unlike the
case with scholars who use modern portfolio theory.

Portfolio strategy and risk model. The portfolio, in general, refers to a diversified
collection of investments that can reduce the risk of investment return—in common
parlance, not putting all your eggs in one basket (Tarantino & Cernauskas, 2010).
Portfolio theory has contributed to the development and measurement of portfolio
diversification and risk management (Fabozzi, 2012). Prior to the development of
portfolio theory, diversification and risks were generally considered independent of each
other, thus leading scholars to underestimate the covariance between assets (Fabozzi,
2012). Markowitz (1952), however, formulated the portfolio variance model (popularly
referred to as the theory of portfolio selection), which became the foundation of modern
portfolio theory (Fabozzi, 2012). Well-diversified portfolios are efficient and can
maintain high expected returns while lowering risk through an analysis of the covariance
between asset returns (Fabozzi, 2012; Jegers, 1997).
For multiple-asset portfolios, the variance of the portfolio return is the sum of the
squared-weighted variances of the individual revenues plus twice the sum of the weighted
pairwise covariance of the assets. For example, the equation measuring portfolio
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diversification with the revenue of three assets—𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗 , and 𝑅𝑘 —is calculated as follows
(Fabozzi, 2012, p. 10):

𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑅𝑝 ) = 𝑤𝑖2 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖 ) + 𝑤𝑗2 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑗 ) + 𝑤𝑘2 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑘 ) +
2𝑤𝑖 𝑤𝑗 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗 ) + 2𝑤𝑖 𝑤𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑘 ) + 2𝑤𝑗 𝑤𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑗 , 𝑅𝑘 )

(3)

where 𝑅𝑝 is the revenue portfolio; 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖 ), 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑗 ),and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑘 ) are the variances of
revenue i, j, and k; cov(Ri, Rj), cov(Ri, Rk), and cov(Rj, Rk) are the covariances between
the revenues i, j, and k; 𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗 ,and 𝑅𝑘 are the returns of assets i, j, and k; and 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑤𝑗 , and
𝑤𝑘 are the weights of revenues i, j, and k. A higher portfolio variance value implies a less
diversified (more volatile) portfolio.
The key determinant of portfolio variance is the covariance of revenues. The
Markowitz portfolio variance model emphasizes the importance of cross-correlation
among revenue sources. For instance, the variance of a portfolio can increase if the
revenue covariances are large and positive, which implies that the revenues move in the
same direction: as asset A increases (decreases), asset B also increases (decreases).
Ideally, negative correlations are best, but rare, since the negative value can reduce the
portfolio variance. Perhaps nonprofits might be able to at least acquire nearly
independent sources, where the correlation is close to zero.
Table 2 helps to illustrate the difference between the HHI and portfolio variance
in the context of nonprofit subsectors. For instance, the Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and
Grant-Making Foundations subsector has relatively high values on both HHI, 0.64, and
portfolio standard deviation, 0.69. These values tell us that this sector, on average, earns
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from diverse revenue sources yet has high risk in regard to portfolios. In contrast, the
Arts, Culture, and Humanities subsector has relative low values on both HHI, 0.12, and
portfolio standard deviation, 0.16, meaning that this sector earns income from few
sources but still has stable portfolios. This comparison tells us that diversifying revenue
by adding more sources may not be equivalent to portfolio stability.
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Revenue Diversification by Sector (Average 2008–2011)
Nonprofit Subfields
NTEE
Code
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W

Diversification

Description
Arts, Culture, & Humanities
Education
Environment
Animal-Related
Health Care
Mental Health & Crisis Intervention
Disease, Disorders, & Medical Disciplines
Medical Research
Crime & Legal-Related
Employment
Food, Agriculture, & Nutrition
Housing & Shelter
Public Safety, Disaster Preparedness, &
Relief
Recreation & Sports
Youth Development
Human Services
International, Foreign Affairs, & National
Security
Civil Rights, Social Action, & Advocacy
Community Improvement & Capacity
Building
Philanthropy, Voluntarism, & Grant-Making
Foundations
Science & Technology
Social Science
Public & Societal Benefit
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HHI (1
diversified; 0
concentrated)
0.12
0.24
0.31
0.16
0.83
0.29
0.20
0.28
0.23
0.40
0.33
0.18

Standard
deviation of
portfolio*
0.16
0.55
0.45
0.12
0.27
0.12
0.11
0.42
0.51
0.20
0.12
0.21

0.15

0.38

0.43
0.11
0.29

0.19
2.06
6.80

0.64

0.24

0.53

0.22

0.24

0.28

0.62

0.69

0.17
0.39
0.22

0.11
0.16
1.68

Table 2 (continued) Summary Statistics of Revenue Diversification by Sector (Average
2008–2011)
X
0.21
Religion-Related
Y
Mutual & Membership Benefit
0.77
Average
0.33
* Standard deviation of portfolio is the square root of portfolio variance.

0.90
4.15
0.84

Hypotheses and Variable Specification
The discussions in the previous section were about revenue volatility
measurement (the limitations of CV and the potential benefits of value-at-risk) as well as
diversification measurement (the limitations of HHI and the potential benefits of portfolio
variance). I now will discuss several possible impacts of financial diversification on
revenue risk, in the nonprofit finance sector. I examine the following hypotheses that
build on previous studies (Table 3):
H1: Greater revenue diversification will decrease revenue risk.
H1(a) Revenue equalization as measured by HHI will decrease downside risk.
H1(b) Portfolio diversification will decrease both deviation and downside risk.
H2: Greater financial flexibility will decrease both deviation and downside risk.
H3: Greater growth potential will decrease both deviation and downside risk.
For a dependent variable, downside risk is calculated by value-at-risk at the 1%
level (α = .01) of the percentage change of total revenue (part VIII, line 12, on IRS form
990, p. 8, 2008). The interpretation is the expected threshold percentage change of total
revenue that occurs in the lowest 1% of the organizations in the subsector. In addition,
the deviation risk is measured by CV, which is the standard deviation divided by the
average percentage change of total revenue (Carrol & Stater, 2009; Chang & Tuckman,
1994; Chikoto & Neely, 2014; Mayer, Wang, Egginton, & Flint, 2014). A higher CV
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value represents a larger standard deviation relative to the expected mean, which implies
a greater level of revenue deviation risk. Note that I used the percentage change in total
revenue to calculate both CV and value-at-risk (Yan, Denison, & Butler, 2009; Chikoto
& Neely, 2014). This can normalize the impact of different sized revenues and include
the zero value, unlike the logarithmic form.
The empirical models include different explanatory variables depending on the
hypothesis. For nonprofit revenues, several scholars have confirmed that greater revenue
equalization can reduce revenue deviation risk (Carroll & Stater, 2009; Chikoto & Neely,
2014; Froelich, 1999; Frumkin & Keating, 2011; Mayer et al., 2014; Yan et al., 2009). It
is well known in portfolio theory that revenue diversification can lower volatility. This is
because greater diversification decreases the chances that all revenue sources will be
exhausted at the same time. For example, if a nonprofit depends on only one source of
revenue, then it may have high revenue risk since no back-up source exists. To measure
revenue diversification, I will use the above mentioned HHI and portfolio variance.
Therefore, under the broad first hypothesis that greater revenue diversification will
decrease revenue risk, this chapter tests two specific hypotheses according to two
different measurements: (a) revenue equalization will decrease downside risk and (b)
portfolio diversification will decrease both deviation and downside risk. By testing these
hypotheses, the results can show whether portfolio variance and value-at-risk are
applicable to the nonprofit finance literature.
In addition to revenue diversification, several factors can influence revenue risk,
such as financial flexibility and growth potential. Financial flexibility can connote
financial leverage or the use of debt. According to Carroll and Stater (2009) and Mayer et
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al. (2014), greater financial leverage can intensify or mitigate the impact of revenue risk.
For instance, greater financial leverage become less vulnerable to economic shocks by
enhancing the liquidity of the funds. Consequently, organizations with greater financial
leverage can better plan their budgets for the future (thus minimizing risks), which is
critical for stable revenue streams. Previous studies have measured financial leverage
with the debt ratio (the total liability divided by total assets). A smaller debt margin
means more financial leverage (Chang & Tuckman, 1994). Mayer et al. (2014) found that
a greater debt margin (i.e., less financial leverage) increases revenue risk, which confirms
H2.
Another view of debt margin exists even though most of the literature in the
nonprofit finance sector views the debt margin as a sign of limited financial capacity. In
the risk management literature, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2004) found that
financially constrained firms tend to keep their debt level low so that they can increase
future debt capacity. Keeping a low debt margin allows the firm to borrow more in the
future when a profitable investment opportunity arises. Therefore, a higher debt margin
can be the sign of healthy level of investment since the nonprofits have invested
profitable assets that they do not need to save the debt capacity for future opportunities.
As well as debt margin, I use the share of permanent endowment relative to total
endowment as a measure of financial flexibility. A high share of permanent endowment
can show both an increase and a decrease in the impact of financial risk. As assumed in
H2, a higher value of permanent endowment ratio can imply lower financial flexibility,
which can increase the impact of revenue risk on nonprofits. If the nonprofits receive
permanent endowments, they must preserve the principal in perpetuity. Such fixed assets
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may not allow nonprofits room to deal with financial difficulties. Furthermore, the
investment income from the endowments can naturally follow the fluctuation of the
market value change of endowment. A higher share of restricted funds therefore can
increase the revenue risk.
On the contrary, a higher ratio of permanent to total endowment can decrease the
impact of revenue risk. According to Tobin (1974), a higher value of permanent
endowment ratio can mean financial stability in the long term over the generations. In
theory, nonprofits with a high permanent endowment are able to diversify their assets and
stabilize their endowment revenue, which would lead to a reduction in revenue risk.
Growth potential signals that a nonprofit’s financial health makes it a viable
business. I measure growth potential by the fund balance (end-of-year assets minus
beginning-of-year assets), retained earnings (total revenue minus total expenses), and net
assets (total assets minus total liabilities and intangible assets) (Calabrese, 2012; Mayer et
al., 2014). Higher fund balances, retained earnings, and net assets represent higher
growth potential. Specifically, the fund balance refers to the accumulation of assets, such
as savings or idle cash. Retained earnings refers to the accumulated surplus balances of
the organization’s programs. Tangible assets such as rainy-day funds, buildings or
automobiles, excluding intangible assets or liabilities comprise net assets. These assets
can involve maintenance expenses but also earn revenue from fixed assets. The
appropriate level of surplus revenues can provide nonprofits with the opportunity to
respond to unexpected events and seize opportunities when they come, which translates
into less risk and more stable and sustainable growth. Mayer et al. (2014) and Carroll and
Stater (2009) confirmed that greater growth potential decreases revenue risk. As a
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counter hypothesis, the risk management literature, generally, has found that higher
profitability or growth potential is greatly associated with high risk (Probst and Raisch,
2005; Reid and Turbide, 2011).
Table 3 Selected Literature on Nonprofit Revenue Risk

H1

H2

Study

Explanatory
Variable
Measure

Revenue
Risk
Measure

Unit of
Observation

Result

Mayer et al.
(2014)

HHI

CV

Nonprofits
grossing more
than $25,000

Confirmed

Carroll &
Stater (2009)

HHI

CV

Nonprofits **

Confirmed

Arts, culture, and
humanities
nonprofits

Confirmed

Nonprofits **

Opposite result
Confirmed with
debt margin

Leverage
(long-term
debt / total
assets)
Financial
capacity
growth*

Yan et al.
(2009)

HHI

Chikoto &
Neely (2014)

HHI

Mayer et al.
(2014)

Debt margin
Total margin

CV

Nonprofits
grossing more
than $25,000

Carroll &
Stater (2009)

Debt margin
Total margin

CV

Organizations**

Insignificant

Mayer et al.
(2014)

Net assets

CV

Nonprofits
grossing more
than $25,000

Confirmed with
net assets

H3

Fund
Confirmed with
Carroll &
balance
CV
Nonprofits **
fund balance and
Stater (2009) Retained
retained earnings
earnings
* Chikoto and Neely (2014) measured financial capacity growth using the percentage
growth in total revenue, total fund balance, and unrestricted fund balance. ** These
papers controlled for service type by including the National Taxonomy of Exempt
Entities (NTEE) as a control variable.
Several organizational factors were also included as control variables in my study
since funding capacity or stability may differ by organizational factors and size.
Specifically, the following variables were included for organizational factors: years of
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operation, the log of lagged employee salaries and benefits, the ratio of administration
and fundraising expenses, the size of the governing board, the number of volunteers, and
the share of unrelated business income (UBI). These variables represent the longevity of
the nonprofit, its reputation, the involvement of communities, and the expanse of the
organization. A greater value of these factors could decrease risk indirectly by changing
the larger environment of the nonprofit.
Particularly high functional expenses and overhead costs (i.e., administration and
fundraising costs related to total expenses) can be considered indicators of organizational
inefficiency. Mayer et al. (2014) and Chikoto and Neely (2014) found that greater
fundraising or administration expenses decreases deviation risk. This situation may result
when an organization’s management utilizes its limited resources to the best of their
capabilities, which potentially increases revenue stability (Tuckman & Chang, 1991).
Carroll and Stater (2009), however, did not find statistically significant results on the
relationship between organizational efficiency and deviation risk. On the other hand,
revenue can grow as the organizational efficiency increases until a certain point but can
then decrease due to excessive spending on administration and fundraising activities
(Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986). Table 4 summarizes the detailed data sources.
Table 4 Data Sources
Variables
Revenue Volatility
Revenue Diversification
Administration Efficiency
Fundraising Efficiency

990 Form
Total revenue (Part VIII, Line 12)
Donative income (Part VIII, Line 1h)
Earned income (Part VIII, Line 2g)
Investment income (Part VIII, Line 3)
Compensation (Part IX, Line 5)
Total Expenses (Part I, Line 18)
Fundraising Expenses (Part I, Line 16b)
Total Expenses (Part I, Line 18)
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Table 4 (continued) Data Sources
Debt Margin_t-1

Total liability (Part I, Line 21)
Total assets (Part I, Line 20)

Permanent endowment

Endowment ratio (Part V, Line 2b)

Net assets*

End of year assets (Part X, Line 16, Column 1)
Beginning of year assets (Part X, Line 16, Column 2)
Total revenue (Part I, Line 12)
Total expenses (Part I, Line 18)
Schedule D, Part VI, Total

Year of operation

Year of formation (Line L)

Fund balance
Retained earnings_t-1

Employee salaries and
Salaries, other compensation, employee benefits (Part
benefits_t-1
I, Line 15)
Number of voting members of
Part I, Line 3
the governing body
Number of volunteers

Part I, Line 6

Share of Unrelated Business
Income

Part VIII, Line 12

Total functional expenses

Part IX, Line 25

*The net asset value is calculated as total assets minus intangible assets and liabilities. Note
that t-1 stands for the one-year lag value of the variable.

Model Specification and Data
This study includes a primary model that investigates the impact of diversification
on revenue volatility within a given subsector (service field) classified by National
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) code. In this model, nonprofit revenue volatility is
estimated as follows:

𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

(4)

where RR, RD, FF, GP, and C for i category of ΝΤΕΕ in year t represent the following
categories of variables, respectively: revenue risk, revenue diversification, financial
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flexibility, growth potential, and control variables. This econometric model was adapted
from Carroll and Stater’s study (2009); the major difference is that I have applied an
alternative measure of revenue volatility and diversification—value-at-risk and portfolio
variance—in addition to the CV and HHI measures. Other differences are that Carroll and
Stater’s unit of observation comprises individual organizations from 1991–2003, and they
control for subfields; in contrast, my unit of observation comprises 25 NTEE subfield
types from 2008–2012.
Table 5 National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) Codes
NTEE
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M

Description
Arts, Culture, & Humanities
Education
Environment
Animal-Related
Health Care
Mental Health & Crisis
Intervention
Disease, Disorders, &
Medical Disciplines
Medical Research
Crime & Legal-Related
Employment
Food, Agriculture, &
Nutrition
Housing & Shelter
Public Safety, Disaster
Preparedness, & Relief

NTEE
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z

Description
Recreation & Sports
Youth Development
Human Services
International, Foreign Affairs, &
National Security
Civil Rights, Social Action, &
Advocacy
Community Improvement &
Capacity Building
Philanthropy, Voluntarism, &
Grant-Making Foundations
Science & Technology
Social Science
Public & Societal Benefit
Religion-Related
Mutual & Membership Benefit
Unknown

* For the purpose of this research, 25 types of nonprofit organizations, coded from A to
Y, were used, with the exception of the category “unknown,” which is Z.
Note. From the National Center for Charitable Statistics. (2005). National Taxonomy of
Exempt Entities. Retrieved from http://nccs.urban.org/classification/NTEE.cfm.
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Before the data were aggregated by subsectors, my panel data included 85,286
total observations over five years. In terms of using Form 990 data, I followed the dataclearing filters suggested by Bowman et al. (2012), although my data still included
different types of small organizations in the sample. The original data had 100,344 total
observations, I excluded nonprofits if they (1) reported group returns (575; 0.57%), (2)
used non-accrual accounting (10,872; 10.83%), and (3) used non-positive assets or
revenue (respectively 62 and 3,549; 0.06% and 3.54%) (Bowman, Tuckman, & Young,
2012). Among the remaining 85,286 observations, each subfield included 750
observations on average (table 6). Subfields related to social science, civil rights, social
action, and advocacy was the smallest group with fewer than 100 observations for each
year.
Table 6 Number of Nonprofits by Year and Subfields
NTEE
Code
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L

Description
Arts, Culture, &
Humanities
Education
Environment
Animal-Related
Health Care
Mental Health &
Crisis Intervention
Disease, Disorders,
& Medical
Disciplines
Medical Research
Crime & LegalRelated
Employment
Food, Agriculture,
& Nutrition
Housing & Shelter

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

767

829

721

731

767

3,815

2,712
228
129
3,467

2,852
231
146
4,133

2,733
208
120
3,904

2,833
219
124
4,026

2,967
225
130
4,088

14,097
1,111
649
19,618

280

377

277

286

294

1,514

136

156

159

158

159

768

136

144

144

136

145

705

96

112

97

99

99

503

411

447

424

443

467

2,192

128

156

147

151

172

754

836

932

728

753

792

4,041

28

Table 6 (continued) Number of Nonprofits by Year and Subfields

M

N
O
P
Q

R

S

T

U
V
W
X
Y

Public Safety,
Disaster
Preparedness, &
Relief
Recreation &
Sports
Youth
Development
Human Services
International,
Foreign Affairs, &
National Security
Civil Rights, Social
Action, &
Advocacy
Community
Improvement &
Capacity Building
Philanthropy,
Voluntarism, &
Grant-Making
Foundations
Science &
Technology
Social Science
Public & Societal
Benefit
Religion-Related
Mutual &
Membership
Benefit
Total

61

76

69

70

74

350

986

1,006

995

1,013

1,060

5,060

149

166

118

125

135

693

2,004

2,130

1,710

1,782

1,805

9,431

181

202

182

200

200

965

29

23

24

28

34

138

832

893

858

882

956

4,421

494

518

527

575

623

2,737

116

130

132

134

136

648

23

25

24

31

32

135

242

267

239

259

262

1,269

166

177

155

154

170

822

1,669

1,710

1,823

1,806

1,842

8,850

16,278

17,838

16,518

17,018

17,634

85,286

The number of observation is 125 aggregated observations, with 25 NTEE fields
over a five-year period between 2008 and 2012, retrieved from Form 990 (IRS, 2015).
For the analysis, I use data after 2008 since Form 990 changed significantly in 2008,
creating inconsistent data. The specific NTEE codes are shown in table 5. The variables
were calculated from individual nonprofits, which were then averaged by NTEE
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subfields. For example, for the value-at-risk of total revenue in percentage change, the
percentage change in total revenue was calculated at the organizational level and the
value at 1 percentile (lowest) was chosen within NTEE subfields. For dependent and
control variables, values were calculated at the organizational level and then averaged by
subsectors and year. For certain control variables, a few observations were excluded
before I created the average value by subsector in cases where certain variables had a
logarithmic form or negative or zero denominators. After dropping these observations,
more than 99% of the total observations remained.
Table 7 Summary Statistics of Total Revenue by Sector (Total Revenue; $, %Δ; Average
2008-2012)
Value
NTEE
Description
Code
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N

Arts, Culture, &
Humanities
Education
Environment
Animal-Related
Health Care
Mental Health & Crisis
Intervention
Disease, Disorders, &
Medical Disciplines
Medical Research
Crime & Legal-Related
Employment
Food, Agriculture, &
Nutrition
Housing & Shelter
Public Safety, Disaster
Preparedness, & Relief
Recreation & Sports

Total
revenue ($)

Volatility
Total
revenue
(%Δ)

Coefficient
Value-atof
risk
variation
(1%; %Δ)
($)

25,300,000

468.74

-0.81

5.91

85,300,000
22,600,000
21,300,000

7.36
2.71
0.22

-0.71
-0.90
-0.67

3.65
3.50
1.75

12.42

-0.69

3.71

24,700,000

0.36

-0.59

2.24

48,300,000

0.47

-0.65

2.77

77,300,000
16,800,000
27,000,000

0.54
0.29
0.12

-0.80
-0.72
-0.61

3.00
2.67
2.75

24,500,000

0.11

-0.65

3.95

-0.86

3.76

197,000,000

6,370,311

1,163.37

7,686,838

0.26

-0.83

2.32

15,400,000

0.30

-0.59

6.73
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Table 7 (continued) Summary Statistics of Total Revenue by Sector (Total Revenue;
$, %Δ; Average 2008-2012)
O
P

Youth Development
Human Services
International, Foreign
Affairs, & National
Security
Civil Rights, Social Action,
& Advocacy
Community Improvement
& Capacity Building
Philanthropy, Voluntarism,
& Grant-Making
Foundations

Q
R
S
T
U

Science & Technology
Social Science

V
W

Public & Societal Benefit
Religion-Related
Mutual & Membership
Benefit

X
Y
Average

10,100,000
26,000,000

0.27
5.52

-0.72
-0.63

2.91
3.65

96,100,000

4.64

-0.90

2.09

-0.72

2.10

30,200,000

2,579.77

15,200,000

7.91

-0.82

3.96

34,200,000

30.96

-0.92

3.47

1.10

-0.81

3.64

0.21

-0.54

1.79

-0.85

3.08

-0.86

2.65

137,000,000
39,500,000
41,500,000
15,400,000

3,758.98
0.43

71,700,000

3.46

-0.83

6.31

44,658,286

322.02

-0.75

3.37

Descriptive findings
Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics for each variable in the analysis.
Nonprofits, on average, had a 12.17 standard deviation of the percentage change in total
revenue, meaning they had a high revenue deviation. Their revenues seem to be
concentrated on one revenue source between donations, earned income, and investment
revenue (they had an HHI of 0.33). Their average portfolio across all subsectors was .84,
or 84% of the standard deviation of the portfolio. Excluding the exceptionally high
standard deviation in the portfolio in certain subfields, such as Youth Development,
Human Services, and Mutual and Membership, the average standard deviation of the
portfolio was approximately .37, or 37%. Note that a negative value-at-risk should be
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interpreted with an absolute value. For example, a value-at-risk of -.75 for the percentage
change of total revenue means that the nonprofits, on average, will have 75% or greater
percentage change in 1% of the organizations.
For financial flexibility, the average debt margin was roughly $.53 per asset, or
almost half their assets. The ratio of permanent endowment was around 15%. On average,
organizations had positive growth potential, such as a $53 increase in assets in the current
year, relative to assets in the previous year (fund balance), $2.38 of revenue per total
expenses (retained earnings), and $17 million of net assets.
Organizations in the sample have operated for around 50 years on average and
have a payroll of roughly $15 million. The average nonprofit spent around 6% and 3% on
administration and fundraising, respectively. They have around 25 voting members on
each organization’s governing body. On average, they have approximately 1% of UBI
and have expenses of $40 million. The correlations among the explanatory and control
variables were low. The variance inflation test (VIF) also indicated that the model was
controlled for potential multicollinearity.
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Downside risk ($1,000 of total revenue;
value-at-risk at 1%)
Downside risk (% Δ of total revenue; valueat-risk at 1%)
Deviation risk ($ of total revenue; CV)
Deviation risk (%Δ of total revenue; CV)
Portfolio diversification (standard deviation
of portfolio)
Revenue equalization (HHI; 0→1; more
diversified)
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Mean

Standard
deviation

Min

Max

129.81

85.43

14.20

419.35

-0.75
3.37
12.17

0.17
1.73
16.02

-0.98
1.40
-74.13

-0.27
13.91
57.56

0.84

3.57

0.09

33.35

0.33

0.22

0.00

1.00

Table 8 (continued) Descriptive Statistics
FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY
Debt margin (total liability / total assets; lag)
Permanent endowment (% / total endowment)
GROWTH POTENTIAL
Fund balance (million $; end assets /
beginning assets)
Retained earnings (million $; total revenue /
total expenses; lag)
Net assets (million $; assets–intangible
assets–liabilities)
CONTROL VARIABLES
Years of operation (#)
Employee salaries and benefits (million $;
lag)
Number of voting members of the governing
body (#)
Number of volunteers (#)
Share of unrelated business income (UBI /
total revenue)
Administration efficiency (administration
expenses / total expenses)
Fundraising efficiency (fundraising expenses /
total expenses)
Total functional expenses (million $)
Observations (25 NTEE, 2008–2012)
* All values are rounded to two decimal places.

0.53
15.62

1.07
11.10

0.14
0.20

11.54
39.61

53.12

52.21

4.27

214.13

2.38

3.99

-7.95

24.33

17.24

19.86

0.56

86.81

47.14

11.06

24.09

68.61

14.87

19.50

1.14

85.57

25.50

20.53

9.05

170.43

4.54

0.76

2.73

6.69

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.05

0.06

0.03

0.01

0.12

0.03

0.02

0.00

0.09

38.50
125

42.73

2.81

207.26

Estimation Results
My models used fixed effects with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) standard errors, which
correct for correlations between sectors and correlations within sectors. Prior to running
the fixed effects regression model, several tests were conducted to estimate the method.
To make a selection between the fixed and random effects models, I ran a Hausman test,
which rejected the null hypothesis that the preferred model was random; thus, I selected
the fixed effects model (Greene, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). The average absolute
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correlation suggested that all four models exhibited cross-sectional dependence (i.e., high
average absolute correlation values) even though the Pesaran test for cross-sectional
independence failed to reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence (De
Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). The modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity in
fixed effects models indicated that all four models had heteroscedasticity. After
considering these tests, I employed the fixed effects model using D-K standard errors.
Hoechle (2007) suggested robust standard estimates for panel models (or fixed effects
within regression models with D-K standard errors). This method helps to control for
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependency. Additionally, some
variables such as debt margin, retained earnings, and employee salaries and benefits used
one-year lag values to control the potential endogeneity of variables.
One potential problem is reverse causality between revenue diversification and
volatility (Carroll & Stater, 2009). In other words, it is plausible that nonprofits with high
revenue risk might diversify their revenue sources even though I have hypothesized that
revenue diversification will reduce their revenue risk. To correct for this potential
endogeneity, I also estimated a fixed effects model with instrumental variables as lagged
dependent and explanatory variables. The fixed effects model with lagged explanatory
variables was comparable with my model, however, which did not show any substantive
differences in the statistical results. This situation shows that no apparent evidence was
found that diversification is endogenously determined.
Combining the two different measures of diversification and volatility produced
three models (Table 9). The first model used deviation risk measured by CV and portfolio
diversification measured by the portfolio standard deviation, which is the square root of
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the portfolio variance. This model showed statistically significant results in hypotheses
1(b) and 3. For H1(b), the existence of a more diversified portfolio decreased the
deviation, as expected and as portfolio theory generally assumes. Specifically, as
portfolio standard deviation increases (less diversification), the standard deviation of
percentage change of total revenue is increased by 0.52, or 52%.
For H3, results show mixed directions for the impact of growth potential on
deviation risk. The existence of a higher fund balance and retained earnings was found to
increase the deviation risk, but higher net assets decreases the risk. Specifically, with a
1% increase in the current year assets compared to the previous year assets, the standard
deviation of percentage change of total revenue is increased by 0.21, or 21%. As the
retained earnings from the previous year increase by $1 million, the standard deviation of
percentage change of total revenue increases by 0.463, or 46.3%. On the other hand, as
net assets increase by 1%, the standard deviation of percentage change of total revenue is
decreased by 0.095, or 9.5%, as previous research confirmed (Mayer et al, 2014). These
results imply that nonprofits with larger accumulations of assets and net profits might
pursue riskier revenue sources with high return (high deviation risk); one with higher
fixed assets might be more inclined to keep themselves in the stable assets.
Model 2 tests the impact of revenue equalization (using HHI) on downside risk
(value-at-risk). This model showed statistically significant results for hypotheses 1(a), 2,
and 3. For H1(a), organizations with equally distributed revenue among donations, earned
revenue, and investment income were found to encounter lower downside risk. For
example, the average value-at-risk was -.75 across subsectors (Table 8), meaning that 1%
of nonprofits can lose 75% or more. With a one unit increase in HHI (more revenue
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sources or equally distributed sources), the percentage change of revenue is increased by
17.4%, which leads to a positive impact on the negative value-at-risk. Therefore, the
average value-at-risk become approximately -.62 across subsector, meaning that 1% of
nonprofits can lose 62% or more after perfect revenue equalization. This means that
revenue equalization by adding more revenue sources or distributing equally among
revenue sources reduces the downside risk.
Higher liability relative to an organization’s assets (i.e., greater financial
inflexibility) decreases downside risk, as opposed to my expectation in H2. An increase
in total liability per assets has a positive impact on negative downside risk, which reduces
downside risk. For instance, the average value-at-risk of -.75 moves toward zero due to
the positive coefficient of .027 or 2.7%. This finding suggests that organizations with
larger debt can be less likely to be in situations where the chance of extreme revenue loss
will increase. Nonprofits with a higher debt ratio may already have stable financial
conditions such that they do not need to save debt capacity for future investment.
Potentially, these organizations are less influenced by extreme revenue loss. Furthermore,
a higher ratio of permanent endowment relative to the total endowment decreases
downside risk. Contrary to my assumption that an organization with more restricted funds
could undergo a liquidity crisis, a high endowment ratio seems to reduce the impact of
downside risk. Higher fund balances and net assets (i.e., greater growth potential) seem to
increase downside risk, contrary to H3. It seems that organizations with higher asset
increase are associated with higher downside risk. Additionally, nonprofits with more
years of operation and that spend less on employee salaries seems to have less downside
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risk. On the other hand, nonprofits that rely more on volunteers seems to have higher
downside risk.
Compared to model 2, model 3 uses portfolio diversification as an explanatory
variable. As I assumed in H1(b), portfolio diversification decreases downside risk. The
negative coefficient of -.007 implies that a less diversified portfolio (higher variance)
negatively influences the negative value-at-risk, meaning that more a diversified portfolio
considering inter-correlations among different revenue sources decreases the impact of
extreme revenue loss.
Table 9 Fixed-effect Regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) Standard Errors
(1)
Deviation Risk
(% Δ; CV)
Revenue equalization (HHI;
0→1; diversified)
Portfolio diversification
(standard deviation of portfolio)
Debt margin (total liability /
total assets; lag)
Permanent endowment (%)
Fund balance (ln; end-beginning
of year assets)
Retained earnings (million $;
revenue-expenses; lag)
Net assets (ln; book value)
Year of operation (#)
Employee salaries and benefits
(ln; lag)
Number of voting members of
the governing body (ln)
Number of volunteers
Share of unrelated business
income (UBI)

0.520***
(-0.124)
-0.822
(-0.498)
0.215
(-0.259)
21.000*
(-9.723)
0.463*
(-0.174)
-9.544**
(-3.185)
-0.457
(-0.663)
-13.796+
(-7.122)
-28.356+
(-15)
14.250***
(-3.713)
598.063**
(-163.714)
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(2)
Downside Risk
(% Δ; value-atrisk at 1%)
0.174*
(0.081)

0.027***
(0.003)
0.006**
(0.002)
-0.191***
(0.035)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.073*
(0.027)
0.015*
(0.007)
0.214**
(0.057)
0.079
(0.544)
-0.081**
(0.022)
-0.583
(2.805)

(3)
Downside Risk
(% Δ; value-atrisk at 1%)

-0.007***
(0.0004)
0.026***
(0.004)
0.005*
(0.002)
-0.188***
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.001)
-0.076**
(0.024)
0.017*
(0.007)
0.211**
(0.066)
0.139
(0.594)
-0.078***
(0.017)
0.596
(2.732)

Table 9 (continued) Fixed-effect Regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) Standard Errors
Administration efficiency
(administration cost ratio)
Fundraising efficiency
(fundraising cost ratio)
Total functional expenses (ln)
Constant
R-squared F
Observations

68.107
-0.596
(-195.278)
(2.405)
-150.315+
-2.105
(-84.968)
(2.297)
33.453*
-0.020
(-12.66)
(0.081)
13.489***
-0.331
(-2.699)
(0.776)
9.639
7.398
125 (25 NTEE, 2008–2012)

-0.263
(2.680)
-2.262
(2.621)
-0.079
(0.081)
0.435
(0.786)
12.966

Table 10 shows results with both revenue equalization and portfolio
diversification in the same models. A diversified portfolio (lower portfolio standard
deviation) decreases both deviation risk and downside risk while revenue equalization
measured by HHI become statistically insignificant. This direct comparison suggests that
portfolio variance has a stronger influence on explaining revenue risks than revenue
equalization. In other words, controlling for portfolio diversification seems to make HHI
an insignificant measure for revenue diversification.
Table 10 Fixed-effect regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) standard errors with both
revenue equalization and portfolio diversification
(1)
Deviation
Risk (% Δ;
CV)
Revenue equalization (HHI; 0→1; diversified)
Portfolio diversification (standard deviation of portfolio)
Debt margin (total liability / total assets; lag)
Permanent endowment (%)
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-9.150
(13.336)
0.516***
(0.124)
-0.870
(0.508)
0.182
(0.268)

(2)
Downside
Risk (% Δ;
value-at-risk
at 1%)
0.167
(0.085)
-0.007***
(0.0004)
0.027***
(0.003)
0.006*
(0.003)

Table 10 (continued) Fixed-effect regression with Driscoll-Kraay (D-K) standard errors
with both revenue equalization and portfolio diversification
21.158*
-0.191***
(10.175)
(0.035)
0.481**
-0.003
Retained earnings (million $; revenue-expenses; lag)
(0.148)
(0.002)
-9.597**
-0.075**
Net assets (ln; book value)
(3.360)
(0.023)
-0.492
0.018**
Year of operation (#)
(0.657)
(0.006)
-15.000
0.232***
Employee salaries and benefits (ln; lag)
(8.653)
(0.060)
-26.440
0.105
Number of voting members of the governing body (ln)
(14.983)
(0.559)
14.576**
-0.084***
Number of volunteers
(4.257)
(0.020)
633.091**
-0.043
Share of unrelated business income (UBI)
(210.691)
(2.603)
69.309
-0.285
Administration efficiency (administration cost ratio)
(200.404)
(2.548)
-151.017
-2.249
Fundraising efficiency (fundraising cost ratio)
(88.072)
(2.464)
30.834**
-0.032
Total functional expenses (ln)
(9.016)
(0.084)
-9.150
0.167
Constant
(13.336)
(0.085)
R-squared F
9.639
7.398
Observations
125 (25 NTEE, 2008–2012)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. Some variables are
applied in the logarithmic form (ln). The net asset value is calculated as total assets minus
intangible assets and liabilities.
Fund balance (ln; end-beginning of year assets)
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Discussion
This chapter addressed the following questions: Can nonprofits reduce downside
revenue risk and revenue volatility by diversifying their revenue portfolios? How should
they deal with different types of risks? My findings contribute in three different ways to
answer these questions in the nonprofit finance and risk management fields. First, a welldiversified portfolio, as measured by portfolio standard deviation, stabilizes revenue
inflows and also makes an organization less vulnerable to major losses (downside risk).
In addition, organizations that focus on simply increasing the number of revenue sources
may not effectively decrease revenue risks when also considering portfolio
diversification. Therefore, having well-balanced portfolios with balanced assets is crucial
for adjusting to continuous volatility. The portfolio should have an appropriate number of
revenue sources and a correlation of revenue sources that reduces portfolio volatility. The
balance eventually prolongs the long-term sustainability of the nonprofits.
Second, portfolio diversification matters more important for larger organizations.
As both risk measurements are relative terms (CV and value-at-risk calculated based on
the percentage change of total revenue), organizations that have larger expected revenue
returns will suffer larger losses during times of financial crisis. Like a house of cards,
nonprofits’ portfolios require a more delicate balance as their size gets larger.
Lastly, what should nonprofit managers consider most in terms of portfolio
diversification? Based on portfolio variance, the covariance of revenue sources is the key
factor when deciding on portfolio diversification. By nature of the calculation of portfolio
variance, portfolio variance will inevitably increase by adding more revenue sources
unless the revenue sources are negatively correlated. If no correlation or inverse
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relationships exist among the revenues, then the covariances will have no impact or will
decrease the portfolio variance. In this case, the more revenue sources you have will
increase portfolio variance by a lower amount. In reality, however, negative correlations
among assets are rare. On the contrary, if revenue sources are positively correlated,
portfolio variance becomes larger. It would therefore be better if the organizations pursue
fewer revenue sources than adding more.
Conclusion
Using a panel of nonprofit financial information obtained from the IRS 990 form
for the period between 2008 and 2012, I used a fixed effects regression model with D-K
standard errors (which controls for the correlations within and between NTEE categories)
to empirically examine whether revenue diversification influences revenue risks. I find
that portfolio diversification can be helpful for nonprofits to reduce downside financial
risk and has a stabilizing effect on revenue inflows. Other factors, such as financial
liquidity and growth potential, also influence downside risk.
My findings have several implications for the nonprofit finance sector and for
EVT in general. First, nonprofit organizations should have a proper portfolio with a
greater number of revenue sources in place to reduce unexpected negative losses. Second,
this study has applied alternative measures from those traditionally used in nonprofit
finance literature: I used portfolio variance instead of HHI for the diversification measure
and value-at-risk instead of CV for the risk measure. These alternative measures
compensate for the weakness of the traditional measures and will help nonprofit
managers and scholars to better consider the impact of portfolio diversification on
downside risk. Finally, this study has applied the concept of value-at-risk from the
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corporate finance sector for the nonprofit finance sector to greater understand risk. Future
researchers should more specifically identify the correlations among nonprofit revenue
sources so that nonprofit managers can develop well-fitted portfolios for their
organizations that will eventually mitigate revenue risks and promote sustainable, longterm growth.
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Chapter Three. The Influences of Budgetary Size on State and Federal
Government Grant Contributions between 2000 and 2011

Government contributions are one major revenue source for nonprofits. In 2013,
32.5% of NPOs’ revenue came from government funding (McKeever, 2015), which in
general includes federal, state, or local governments. According to the Federal Assistance
Award Data System (FAADS), 7% of total federal government grants, representing $36.3
billion of the $537 billion awarded in 2012, are awarded directly to NPOs (Lecy &
Thornton, 2016). However, the primary mechanism for government grant awards to
NPOs is by means of a “pass-through” of sub-awards from the federal government to
state and local governments. The federal government transfers 80.1% ($431 billion out of
$537 billions) of its grants to state governments; the amount of grant transfers from state
and local governments to NPOs remains unknown.
In addition, the source of external revenue support (such as from the government)
can affect the stability of nonprofit operations. Although government grants represent the
second largest revenue source for nonprofits, that revenue can depend on the financial
stability of different levels of government. For instance, governments at all levels of the
U.S. government paid $130 billion to U.S. nonprofits for services in 2014, but these
governmental bodies did not pay the full costs of the services performed; more than half
of the nonprofits actually reported that the government had reimbursed them for less than
10 percent of their organizational costs (National Council of Nonprofits, 2017). The
government was also late in providing much of this reimbursement. Of nonprofits that
provided programs and services to different government bodies in 2014, around onequarter found that the federal government had paid more than 30 days late. The problem
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was even more serious at the state and local levels, where late government payments
affected approximately 30–35 percent of nonprofit contractors (National Council of
Nonprofits, 2017). Even though government support is generally known to be a stable
and secure source of revenue for nonprofits, such underpayment or late payment can
place nonprofits in financially difficult conditions. For these reasons, studying changes in
government grants awarded to nonprofits can provide useful information; in addition,
since government grants are becoming a more significant part of nonprofits’ revenues in
terms of maintaining financial security and mission-oriented objectives, an exploration of
the understudied topic of government grants awarded to nonprofits is in order.
Most previous research on government contributions and government-NPO
partnerships has focused on specific service fields, individual NPOs, or isolated cases,
events, or states (Ashley & Slyke, 2012; Gazely, 2008; Hansamann, 1987; Luksetich,
2008; Saidel, 1991; Sandfort, 1999; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). However, little
comprehensive or generalizable empirical research on government-NPO partnerships
exists. In addition, few studies have examined government contributions to NPOs at
different governmental levels. As the extent of state government grants to NPOs remains
unknown (Ashley & Slyke, 2012; Lecy & Thornton, 2016), the topic is worth studying;
the same can be said of federal government grant funding.
This study, therefore, estimates the effect of the size of government expenditures
on the amounts of state and federal government grant awards to nonprofit organizations
(NPOs) at the state level. It also analyzes the differences in the responses of the states and
the federal government. A fixed effects model of states and years controls for five factors
at the state level that were identified in previous research: service field, organization,
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political activity, economics, and demographics. The empirical results demonstrate that
smaller state government expenditures correspond to state government grant awards to
NPOs, that state and federal grants target different demographic groups, and that NPOs
with state contributions tend to diversify their revenue sources, whereas NPOs with
federal contributions tend to simplify their revenue sources and encourage private
funding. This research, then, is to contribute to a better understanding among nonprofit
researchers and professionals of the allocation of state and federal government grant
funding, and of its relationship to state government budgets.
This chapter is organized as follows. The hypothesis is developed in sections (1)
Fiscal Federalism and NPOs and (2) State Government and Government Contributions to
NPOs. NPOs’ need for government grants is explained in Government Grants as a Tool
in the Government-NPO Partnership. The section Legitimacy of Government
Involvement through Grant Awards explains how government benefits by awarding
grants to NPOs. Method and Model Specification explains the variables and data sources
and introduces two models and the study methodology. Finally, the Results and Policy
Implications and Conclusions sections include the interpretation of statistical results, a
discussion of the implications of the study findings, and suggestions for future research.
External Income Sources in Nonprofit Organizations
NPOs’ external income typically comes from three sources: direct public support,
indirect public support, and government contributions (grants), as categorized under part
I of tax Form 990 (an annual reporting return that certain federal tax-exempt
organizations must file with the IRS). Regardless of income, all 501(c)(3) private
foundations and most federal tax-exempt organizations are required to file Form 990
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(Powell & Steinberg, 2006). NPOs’ external income sources can be interrelated as interorganizational relationships.
Government Grants as a Tool in the Government-NPO Relationship
Obtaining and maintaining government grants can be expensive (Grønbjerg,
1993), and organizations that receive such grants are required to undertake more complex
and time-consuming financial reporting than those relying primarily on individual or
private contributions (Anheier, 2005; Salamon & Anheier, 1997). For example, since
2007, the Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) (2014) has
investigated and awarded grants to children’s advocacy center programs annually; these
are generally run by nonprofit and for-profit organizations and institutes of higher
education. The OJJDP offers total one-year program funding of $750,000, with secondand third-year funding allocated on the basis of performance. This funding assists NPOs
capable of providing coordinated support to victims of child abuse. However, the grant
application process demands significant time and effort. In a given year, applicants must
submit approximately 30 pages of information by May 25, including a project abstract, a
budget and budget narrative, performance measures, and other data, all of which must be
supported by bibliographical references. The review process includes an internal peer
review, an external peer review, a review by the Office of the Chief Financial Officer,
and a review by the Assistant Attorney General. The award is made no later than
September 30 of the same year. Some NPOs require years of preparation before they can
apply for this grant; indeed, Bowman (2011) noted that preparing a government grant
proposal should be treated as a fundraising expense.
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NPOs need government grants for three reasons. The first of these is revenue
diversification; NPOs with a mix of revenue streams are better equipped to manage
financial risk and to reduce their vulnerability to financial hardship and uncertainty
(Carroll & Stater, 2009; Grønbjerg, 1993; Webb, 2014; Young, 2007). Because
government grants tend to be larger than private contributions, they can also be used as
seed money to match funds from non-grant sources. A balance of low-risk, predictable
revenue from government grants and other high-return, higher-risk investments can
support an organization’s long-term financial sustainability (Seaman & Young, 2010). In
an empirical test of the revenue sources of 156 foster care organizations, Kingma (1993)
found that NPOs with a higher percentage of revenue from government sources
experienced lower than average volatility levels.
Second, the reputation of NPOs in receipt of government grants engenders trust
among private contributors (Andreoni & Payne, 2011). While private donors have little
access to information about how NPOs spend their funds (Ostrom, 1996), NPOs must
prove their experience and the legitimacy of their services or programs, and must have
the necessary infrastructure to serve their clients in order to successfully apply for
government grants. A government grant therefore conveys a powerful message to private
contributors about an organization’s managerial and administrative capacity. Nikolova
(2014) found that private donors in the U.S. are more likely to respond positively to
information about government funding from national and international sources than to
information about organizational efficiency or age.
Finally, government grants are more broadly accessible than private contributions,
and they are less likely to lead to mission displacement. Government support is more
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widely dispersed than private contributions, which generally favor large and popular
NPOs with simple mission statements (DiMaggio, 1987; Grønbjerg, 1993). In an
investigation of the relationship between government and NPOs, Salamon (1995)
concluded that government funding produces relatively small shifts in the missions of
organizations that pursue diverse revenue streams. In summary, government grants
encourage the nonprofit sector by enhancing financial security, supplementing private
donations, and causing less mission displacement (Anheier, 2005; Grønbjerg, 1993).
Grant-Based Relationship Between State Government and NPOs
Figure 1 shows similar trends in the percentage change in government grants
awarded to the five most populous states from 1995 to 2007. The percentage change in
government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations was generally between 20% and 20%, except in 2000. However, the extent of the percentage change differed across states.
For example, the amount of government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations
significantly decreased from 1998 and 1999, hit its bottom in 2000, and increased again
in 2001. The amount of government grants in Illinois and New York started to decrease
by -75.05% and -35.73% respectively from 1998 to 2000. The amount of government
grant in Texas, Florida, and California started to decrease -55.77%, -30.73%, and 56.34% respectively from 1999 to 2000. Government grants awarded in all five states
drastically increased between 2000 and 2001: 70.62% (California), 25.90% (Florida),
53.75% (Illinois), 39.92% (New York), and 47.72% (Texas).
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Figure 1. Percentage change in government grants awarded to nonprofits for the five most
populous states and U.S. average
In Figure 2, the percentage change in government grants awarded to nonprofit
organizations of 50 states by region varied from 1995 to 1999. For example, in the
Midwest area (which includes 12 states ND, SD, MN, WI, MI, OH, IN, IL, MO, IA, KS,
and NE), government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations increased sharply from
1995 to 1996 and subsequently followed similar trends with other regions. Interestingly,
the percentage of government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations by region
simultaneously decreased from 1999 to 2000, and simultaneously increased from 2000 to
2001. After 2001, the variance of the percentage change of government grants awarded to
nonprofit organizations ranged roughly within 0 and 40. For example, the percentage of
government grants awarded to nonprofit organizations in the Northeast area increased
more than those in other regions from 2002 to 2003 and decreased more that other
regions from 2003 to 2004.
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Figure 2. Percentage change in government grants awarded to nonprofits by region for 50
U.S. states
Note: Sourtheast region includes AR, MS, LA, AL, TN, KY, WV, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL,
AL; Northeast region includes PA, NY, VT, ME, NH, MA, CT, RI, NJ, MD, DE;
Southwest region includes AZ, NM, TX, OK; Midwest region includes ND, SD, NE, KS,
MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, MI, OH; and West region includes WA, MT, OR, ID, WY,
CA, NV, UT, CO, AK, HI.

Theoretical Discussion
Several theories attempt to explain the relationship between government and
nonprofit sector. Two relationships between government and NPOs are specific to the
provision of public goods, complementary and supplementary relationship (Boris &
Steuerle, 2006; Young 2000 & 2012). I exclude the adversarial assumption, which refers
to the check and balance relationship between the government and NPOs, since this
relationship is close to the advocacy activities, and not directly related to the provision of
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public goods. Young (2012) defined such relationships as complementary or/and
supplementary. In a complementary relationship, NPOs support the delivery and
provision of existing government services that might include education, health care,
museums, symphony orchestras, libraries, parks, housing, community development, and
overseas aid. In general, these NPOs are funded by the government sector, and
government expenditures tend to relate directly to the financing of NPOs; in other words,
as government expenditures increase, financing of NPOs also increases.
In contrast, a supplementary relationship means that an NPO produces public
services in lieu of the government. When the government begins to provide services,
NPOs have less responsibility to produce them and thus experience lower demand.
Examples of supplementary government-NPO relationships might include such activities
as animal rescue, disaster relief, and environmental protection, as well as professional
associations with social agendas, venture philanthropy organizations (e.g., the Robin
Hood Foundation), public policy initiatives, private foundations (e.g., the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation; the Turner Foundation), or international nongovernmental
organizations. In some cases, these and other public services not yet provided by the
government may be voluntarily provided by individuals. In such relationships, as
government expenditures increase, financing of NPOs decreases.
Method and Model Specification
Method and Observation
The present objective is to assess whether state or federal government
contributions to NPOs increase or decrease as state government expenditures increase. To
address this question empirically, I apply a fixed effects regression model using Driscoll
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and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors to analyze data from multiple observations of 50
states over the period 2000–2011. In general, models can use fixed and random effects to
control for certain fixed and unobserved intra-state characteristics, such as management
style, historical and cultural differences, and geographical characteristics.
Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors make it possible to control cross-state
correlation issues, which fixed and random effects models generally ignore. Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) noted that certain unobservable factors might be shared both among and
within states—for example, some states might encourage or discourage the activities of
NPOs. Additionally, nearby states might be spatially correlated, or states might be
affected by states that are politically or economically similar. Across the 50 states, there
are 1,225 correlations (50 times 49 divided by 2) (Hoechle, 2007); these issues can be
addressed using spatial correlation consistent (SCC) models (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998).
The present study focuses on NPOs that filed a Form 990 from 2000 to 2011 and
reported gross receipts greater than or equal to $200,000 or total assets greater than or
equal to $500,000 at the end of the tax year. Because the standards used to file Form 990
changed multiple times between 2000 and 2011, this study adopts the strictest standard
(2010) for consistency. In addition, the study includes large NPOs required to file Form
990 but not 990-N, 990-EZ, or 990-PF (Table 11). This study focuses on large NPOs
because of the high expenses to obtain and maintain grants (Grønbjerg, 1993), and
organizations that receive government grants must undertake more complex and timeconsuming financial reporting tasks than those relying primarily on individual or private
contributions (Anheier, 2005). For those reasons, large NPOs tend to be more capable of
obtaining and managing government grants.
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Table 11 Versions of Form 990
Form to File
Status
990-N
Gross receipts ≤$50,000
990-EZ
Gross receipts < $200,000, and Total assets < $500,000
Gross receipts ≥$200,000, or Total assets ≥ $500,000
990
990-PF
Private foundation–regardless of financial status
Source: Which forms do exempt organizations file? (Updated 8 February 2016) (IRS)
Retrieved from https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/form-990-series-which-formsdo-exempt-organizations-file-filing-phase-in

Models and Dependent Variables
In this first model, the dependent variable is the total amount of state and local
government grants awarded to state-based NPOs. Because no data are available for direct
measurement of state government grants awarded to NPOs, I calculate this amount by a
proxy variable. Specifically, to calculate the total amount of state government grants per
capita, I subtract the amount of federal grants from the total amount of government grants
to NPOs. I then divide the total amount of state government grants by the total state
population.

Model 1
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
= 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝜃1
+ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝜃2
+ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝜃3 + 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝜃4
+ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝜃5 + 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝜃6
+ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝜃7 + 𝜀̃𝑖𝑡
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𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
=

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑃𝑂𝑠 − 𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Data on the total amount of government grants were retrieved from Form 990 data
archived by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (IRS, 2015).
In the second model, the dependent variable is the total amount of federal
government grants awarded to NPOs in a given state.
Model 2
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
= 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝜃1
+ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝜃2
+ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝜃3 + 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝜃4
+ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝜃5 + 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝜃6
+ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝜃7 + 𝜀̃𝑖𝑡

To calculate this variable, the total amount of federal government grants is
divided by the total state population (Model 2). Data on amounts of federal government
grants awarded to NPOs were collected from USA Spending (2016). This variable does
not include negative values.
Dependent Variable for Model 2
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
=

𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
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Amounts of state and local and federal government grant support to the nonprofit
sector fluctuate, and patterns differ across states. Appendices 1 and 2 detail the
percentage changes in state and federal government grants to NPOs in all 50 U.S. states.
Figure 3 shows that the amount of state government contributions has fluctuated over the
study period, and that the patterns differ across the 50 states. In contrast, the amount of
federal government contributions has historically exhibited similar cross-state patterns
(figure 4).

Figure 3 Average State Grants Awarded to NPOs by U.S. States (2000–2011, %Δ)
Note. The horizontal axis indicates the years from 2000 to 2011, and the vertical axis
indicates the percentage change of state government grant funding to the NPOs
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Figure 4 Average Federal Grant Funding Awarded to NPOs by 50 U.S. States (2000–
2011, %Δ)
Note. The horizontal axis indicates the years from 2000 to 2011, and the vertical axis
indicates the percentage change of federal government grant funding to the NPOs.
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Explanatory and Control Variables
For the explanatory variable, the spending size of the state government is
measured by the size of its budgetary expenditure as a proportion of the gross state
product (GSP), as follows:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑒𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡

The control variables consist of numerous measurements dependent on the
relevant factors such as state government expenditures, service field and organizational
factors, nonprofit finance, and state characteristics (economy, politics, and demographic).
Table 12 Variables and Literature
Variable
State Government Expenditures
Service Field & Organizational
Factors

Literature
Young (2012); Carroll & Stater (2009)
Salamon (1987); McCarthy (1994); Bremner
(1988);

Nonprofit Finance

Calabrese (2011); Carroll & Stater (2009);
Frumkin & Keating (2002); Hager (2001);
Keating et al. (2005); Trussel et al. (2002);
Tuckman & Chang (1991)
Hall (2006); Twombly (2003); Gittell & Tebaldi
(2006); Prentice (2015); Keating et al. (2005)

State Characteristics
(Economy, Politics, and
Demographic)

The service classification comprises of six distinct fields selected from the
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE): art, culture, and humanities; education;
health; human services; public and social benefit; and religion (The Urban Institute,
2012). The distribution of government grants to NPOs differs across service fields.
Because NPOs provide different services with distinct characteristics, it is necessary to
control for the size of nonprofit sectors in relation to the service field (DiMaggio, 1987;
Froelich, 1999; Lipsky & Smith, 1990; McMurtry, Netting, & Kettner, 1991).
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Organizational factors such as income sources, spending sources, and financial health are
used to measure the size of the NPO support from government (Anheier, 2005;
Grønbjerg, 1993).
Table 13 Data Sources
Dependent Variable
State and Federal
IRS 990 Form (2014); Federal Assistance Awards Data
Government Grants
(FAADs) (2016)
Explanatory and Control Variable
Service Field
IRS 990 Form (2014)
IRS 990 Form (2014); Lam & McDougle (2015); Letts
Organizational Finance
(1999)
Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, & Klarner (2010,
Political Characteristics
1998); Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993); Jordan &
Grossmann (2016); Klarner (2013); McDonald (2016)
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2016); U.S. Bureau
Economic Characteristics of Labor Statistics (2012, 2015); U.S. Census Bureau
(2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2016)
Cooperation for National Community Service (2015);
Demographic
Jordan & Grossmann (2016); Klarner (2013) Kramer
Characteristics
(1981); U.S. Census Bureau (2016)
State Government
Urban Institute (2015)
Finance

Nonprofit financial condition may lead to different sizes of government support.
These financial ratios are used to measure the size of nonprofit financial stability:
membership income ratio, asset-sales income ratio, and inventory-sales income ratio.
Lastly, state economic, political, and demographic factors can affect the size of
government support to nonprofit sector (Brown et al., 2012). For instance, a state’s
economic condition may influence awards of state government grants to NPOs. In
general, economically stable states tend to distribute greater amounts of state government
grant funding, and there is evidence that median household income, unemployment rate,
and poverty rate tend to influence the extent of government financial support (Bennett,
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2012; Carroll & Stater, 2009; Joassart-Marcelli & Wolch 2003; Keating et al., 2005;
Prentice, 2015). The economic factor comprises of unemployment rate (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2012), median household income (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012), poverty
rate (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012), and the coincident index (Crone & Clayton-Matthews,
2005; Stock & Watson, 1989). The higher coincident index shows the state economic
health. Higher value shows more active state economy.
A state’s political and demographic characteristics may influence the amount of
government contributions to NPOs. Governments alter levels of financial support for
NPOs according to their social and political agendas, ideologies, and priorities (Hall,
2006, 2010). Or, governments are willing to support NPOs according to demand for
public services, which may vary due to local demographic factors such as wealth
distribution, volunteerism, population density, population growth rate, education level,
age, and racial structure (Gamm & Putnam, 1999; Gittell & Tebaldi, 2006; Lincoln,
1977; Prentice, 2015; Saxton & Benson, 2005; Skocpol, Ganz, & Munson, 2000;
Twombly, 2003). Table 13 shows detailed data sources.
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Variables (Model 1 and 2)
State Grants to NPO ($2011,
millions)
Federal Grants to NPOs ($2011,
millions)
State government expenditure
(Total state expenditure/SGP)
Federal government expenditure
Gini Index (0 equality→1
inequality)
Number of Art NPOs/NPO total
Number of Education NPOs/totals

Total Observation (n = 600)
50 States, 2000–2011
Mean
SD
Min

Max

80.67

154.43

-96.00

1153.08

53.43

47.67

1.54

482.09

7.86

9.80

0.37

67.71

322.31

378.00

4.64

3341.82

0.45

0.02

0.38

0.50

0.04
0.18

0.02
0.05

0.00
0.04

0.13
0.32
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Table 14 (continued) Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Number of Health NPOs/totals
Number of Human Service
NPOs/total
Number of Social Service
NPOs/totals
Number of Religious NPOs/NPO
total
Number of employees (#)
Number of NPOs (#)
NPOs with gross receipts above $1M
(%)
Membership income/total revenue
Asset sales income/total revenue
Inventory sales/total revenue
Personnel cost/total expense
Fundraising administration cost
ratio
(Fundraising cost/total expense)
Revenue diversity score (HHI)
Governor non-majority party
(0 majority party; 1 non-majority
party)
State ideology score (Con→ Lib)
Voting turnout ratio (Vote for
Highest Office/Voting Eligible
Population)
Unemployment rate (%)
Poverty rate (%)
Coincident index (#)
Volunteer hours per resident
(hour)
Volunteer rate (%)
Population growth rate (Δ%)
Population density (# per sq. mile)
College graduation rate (%)
Age under 18/state total
Age over 65/state total
Black population/state total
Native Indian/Alaska Natives/state
total
* All values are rounded.

0.30

0.08

0.12

0.68

0.24

0.06

0.05

0.39

0.11

0.04

0.03

0.28

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.04

0.47
0.31

0.17
0.35

0.10
0.01

1.19
1.77

1.32

0.73

0.09

4.99

0.01
0.02
0.00
0.31

0.01
0.04
0.00
0.05

0.00
-0.18
0.00
0.14

0.06
0.34
0.03
0.47

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.02

0.38

0.14

0.01

0.74

0.01

0.11

0.00

1.00

-0.15

0.13

-0.65

0.35

0.52

0.11

0.29

0.78

5.70
12.27
146.29

2.10
3.24
18.66

2.30
4.50
98.08

13.80
23.10
227.45

3.85

1.42

-3.91

13.74

0.30
0.01
188.89
25.43
0.25
0.13
0.11

0.07
0.01
253.51
4.79
0.02
0.07
0.10

0.09
-0.06
1.10
14.83
0.20
0.06
0.00

0.56
0.04
1189.26
39.10
0.32
0.79
0.39

0.03

0.00

0.15

0.02
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Results
The empirical results confirm that the size of the state government budget
inversely relates to the amount of state government grants. According to table 15, for
every 1% increase in state government expenditures relative to GSP, the state
government funding awarded to NPOs per capita decreased by around $6. The size of
federal government expenditures exhibits a negative relationship with the amount of state
and local government grant awards to NPOs. For every 1% increase in federal
government expenditures on grants relative to SGP, per capital state and local
government funding awards to NPOs decreased by $.05. With regard to the service field
variable, the state and local government contribution is not correlated with service field
type except for faith-based religious NPOs.
With regard to organizational factors, per capita state and local government
funding positively correlates with size of human resources, suggesting that nonprofits
with a larger staff size tend to receive more grants than nonprofits with fewer employees.
On the other hand, gross receipt size larger than 1million dollars positively influences the
federal government grants. NPOs’ financial structures differently affect state and federal
grant funding. State and local grant funding negatively correlates with membership
income and personnel costs but positively correlates with inventory sales income. In
contrast, federal government contributions positively relate to membership income and
fundraising administration costs but negatively relate to inventory sales. Similarly, NPOs’
financial health also has different effects on state and federal contributions; specifically,
revenue diversification positively relates to state grant funding, but negatively relates to
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federal grant funding. State and local governments award more grants to nonprofits in the
state where their governor is in the non-majority party (Klarner 2003).
Economic factors also have a statistically significant effect on both state and
federal grant awards. As a state’s economy improves, state and local grant funding
decreases but federal grant funding increases. It is worth noting that demographic factors
exert differing effects on state and local and federal grants. In particular, state and local
government contributions increase in states where the population density is higher, the
population ratio of residents over 65 years is higher, and the population ratio of residents
under 18 years is smaller. Federal government contributions increase in the states where
the number of volunteer hours per resident is smaller, and the black and American
Indian/Alaskan Native population is larger. In short, federal grants are more commonly
associated with traditionally underserved populations.
Table 15 Fixed Effects Regression Results
Model 1
State and local government
contribution per capita
($2011)
β
S.E.
Explanatory Variables
State government expenditure
(per capita: state
expenditure/SGP;$2012)
Control Variables
Federal government expenditure (.01)
Gini Index (0 equality→1 inequality)
Number of Art NPOs/NPO total
Number of Education NPOs/totals
Number of Health NPOs/totals
Number of Human Service
NPOs/total
Number of Social Service
NPOs/totals

-5.48

Model 2
Federal government
contribution per capita
($2011)
β
S.E.

**

2.25

-0.05 **
145.61
-132.87
77.71
152.26

0.02
312.41
278.38
134.11
126.03

51.75

143.48

-47.17

30.37

-61.51

136.85

-15.52

43.14
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1.67 *

0.04 ***
-129.84
-73.79
-17.82
-26.65

0.92

0.01
121.03
66.67
34.09
43.90

Table 15 (continued) Fixed Effects Regression Results
Number of Religious NPOs/NPO
total
Number of employees (#)
Number of NPOs (#)
NPOs with gross receipts above $1M
(%)
Membership income/total revenue
Asset sales income/total revenue
Inventory sales/total revenue
Personnel cost/total expense
Fundraising administration cost ratio
(Fundraising cost/total expense)
Revenue diversity score (HHI)
Governor majority party (0 majority;
1 non)
State ideology score (Con→ Lib)
Voting turnout ratio (Vote for
Highest Office/Voting Eligible
Population)
Unemployment rate (%)
Poverty rate (%)
Coincident index (#)
Volunteer hours per resident (hour)
Volunteer rate (%)
Population growth rate (Δ%)
Population density (# per sq. mile)
College graduation rate (%)
Age under 18/state total
Age over 65/state total
Black population/state total
Native Indian/Alaska Natives/state
total
Constant
*p <.10; **p <.05; ***p <.01

680.28 **

285.86

-180.70

143.18

113.24 **
-128.66

55.98
111.75

-8.24
3.26

9.24
31.09

-1.58
-3788.61 ***
-75.56
1585.65 **
-143.05*

8.29
716.31
54.95
748.07
71.40

*
5.08
384.63 **
29.23
-369.21 **
-32.41

2.85
148.93
17.69
157.08
22.58

***
3498.91
-60.90 ***

987.41
11.60

662.32
2014.35
273.00***
37.10
17.57
-13.36

**

8.11
18.45

-1.38
-7.39

1.92
4.47

41.19

44.27

-9.59

29.53

-15.55***
2.99
-1.61***
1.20
46.99
-241.00
1.43 ***
-2.09
-1045.18 **
40.76 **
-462.86

3.03
1.78
0.38
1.77
38.95
203.24
0.31
5.98
380.88
19.43
490.91

-0.74
-0.52
0.48 **
-0.69 **
-3.62
113.86
-0.28
2.51
-218.41
7.25
705.49 ***

1.08
0.40
0.18
0.25
12.41
155.59
0.18
1.77
170.49
4.27
167.94

-1363.92

969.90

1183.28 ***

378.44

10.42

-1.98

Discussion
This research addresses the influence of state and federal government
expenditures on state and federal grant contributions to NPOs. As previous studies of
government grant awards have focused on specific cases or individual organizations or
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states, their findings have not been generalizable. The present study focuses instead on
the comprehensive and relative effects of a range of factors on state and government
contributions.
According to the results, states with small expenditures tend to award more state
government grants to nonprofits. This suggests that the grant-based relationship between
state and local governments and local NPOs is supplementary—in other words, state
governments with smaller expenditures award more grants to local nonprofits to produce
the public services on behalf of state government, reflecting supplementation of nonprofit
activity. On the other hand, nonprofits in the states with large expenditures tend to
receive a lot of federal grants, which implies complementary grant-based relationships
between federal government and NPOs. Local nonprofits tend to produce public services
that state governments also produce when they receive more federal grants.
In addition, the characteristics of nonprofits significantly influence the amount of
government grants. For instance, NPOs receiving state contributions also tend to
diversify their revenue sources, expanding inventory sales. Those receiving federal
contributions tend to simplify their revenue sources with recruiting a lot of membership
fees. This result could also suggest that the volatility of state and federal grant funding
may influence NPOs’ financial activities; specifically, state grant funding fluctuated
during the study period (either increasing or decreasing), and these patterns differed
across states (Appendix 1). This encourages NPOs that receive state and local
contributions to diversify their revenue sources and to become larger employers, making
them better able to withstand economic recessions or other external shocks that may
affect state government funding. In contrast, federal grant contributions show a
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continuous increase over the study period, and their distribution patterns are similar
across states (Appendix 2). This growth stability allows NPOs receiving federal grants to
focus on their grant programs and fundraising activities, placing less emphasis on
diversifying revenue sources or expanding the organization.
Since this study aims to analyze the comprehensive impact on government
contributions, the results include some limitations. First, the use of the IRS Form 990
confined the analysis to larger nonprofits. The study therefore excluded smaller NPOs
that received state government grants. This disproportionate sample, however, could
reflect reality better since large NPOs are better equipped to apply for and manage
government grants. Another limitation is that the computation of state government grants
used a proxy measure (total government contribution minus federal government grants)
to estimate the amount of state government grants, as the IRS Form 990 does not identify
the sources of government contributions.
The study confirms that state government expenditures correspond to state and
federal government grant awards to NPOs at the state level. It also explains the differing
relationships between state and federal governments and NPOs, highlighting specific
factors. Future research should investigate whether the government-NPO relationship
differs by service field, and whether state expenditure on a given service field relates to
government grant contributions for NPOs in that field.
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Chapter Four. Coping with Economic Crisis: The Buffering Capacity of U.S.
States for the Nonprofit Sector

Dealing successfully with unexpected external shocks is crucial for the survival of
organizations not only in the for-profit and governmental sectors but in the nonprofit
sector as well. Unfortunately, compared to the number of studies on the private and
public sectors, only a relatively small number of studies have examined the effects of
economic crises on the nonprofit sector. Some of these studies on the nonprofit sector
assume that economic crises negatively influence nonprofit organizations. For example,
the 2008 economic recession resulted in a reduction of public and private funding
available for nonprofit organizations, leading to the closure of programs, facilities, and
even whole organizations (Cannon & Donnelly-Cox, 2015). On the other hand, the
nonprofit sector may react differently to a recession by expanding its range of services or
increasing the number of nonprofit organizations to respond to the increased service
demands. A recession can result in the creation of more nonprofit organizations, although
organizations established during a recession period are generally smaller in size, with
fewer staff members, smaller budgets, greater reliance on volunteers, and a focus on a
specific subfield, such as housing and homeless shelters (Wilhelm, 2010).
Economic crises have occurred repeatedly in history. Two major recessions
occurred between the years 2000 and 2012: in the years 2000–2002 and 2007–2008. The
characteristics of these recessions are different from each other. The 2000–2002
recession, also known as the dot-com bubble, was an economic bubble period caused by
the extreme growth and subsequent failure of internet and information-technology
companies. The growth of the internet and telecommunication business in the late 1990s
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created large investment opportunities for individual investors, venture capitalists, and
information-technology companies. The information-technology companies wanted to
grow faster to increase their market power and expanded beyond their capacity with low
interest rates. In addition, investors wanted to earn quick and large returns from the
growing stock market. However, the stock market crashed in 2000 once the bubble had
reached its peak (Glassman, 2015). After the sharp drop in stock prices, investors started
to sell their stocks even at a loss and the companies concerned began to have liquidity
issues (Goldfarb et al., 2007). The attacks of September 11, 2001 accelerated the market
downturn. Many employees lost their jobs and only 48% of technology companies
survived through 2004 (Berlin, 2008).
On the other hand, the economic recession of 2007–2008, also known as the Great
Recession (Blinder, 2015), was one of the worst economic crises since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. The crisis began with a collapse of the subprime mortgage
market in the United States. The bubble in the mortgage market grew due to excessive
mortgage lending with low interest rates and risky loans encouraged by the government
sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As a result, the delinquency rate
rose, which led to a devaluation of mortgage-backed securities and liquidity issues. The
subsequent collapse of the mortgage market in the U.S. triggered an international banking
crisis, involving the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers as well as the financial issues of
major banks and financial institutes in Europe and Asia. The ensuing economic recession
affected not only many individuals and domestic and international companies, but also
the nonprofit sector.

67

This chapter aims to investigate the number of nonprofit organizations at the U.S.
state level to clarify which factors regulate and adjust the influence of economic
recessions on the nonprofit sector during the two economic crises of 2000–2002 and
2007–2008. To test this research question, an empirical analysis was conducted on the
nonprofit sector in 50 states as the unit of analysis using panel data for 2002 to 2012
retrieved from Form 990. The empirical results contribute to the theory of nonprofit risk
management and explain the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of its
response to economic crisis.
Literature Review
Economic Recessions and Nonprofit Revenues
Economic recessions can cause changes in financial support for nonprofits from
individual donors, the for-profit sector, and the government. First, contributions to
nonprofits from individuals change due to recessions. Gittell and Tebaldi (2006)
suggested several factors that can influence personal contributions across states,
including personal income, the marginal tax rate as the price of giving, and economic and
demographic factors. Gittell and Tebaldi (2006) measured economic and demographic
factors using variables such as average contributions, personal incomes, net capital gains,
volunteering rates, educational levels, percentage of baby boomers (aged 35–54 years) in
the population, and other control variables. Most of the data were for the years 2000 to
2002. They concluded that baby boomers had limited discretionary capital to spend on
charitable contributions during the 2000-2002 recession. Because baby boomers had been
perhaps overly optimistic in the mid- to late-1990s about future economic conditions,
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they were left with debts from purchases made during those optimistic yeas and thus had
to reduce their giving during the 2000-2002 recession.
Second, for-profit firms may also change their contributions to nonprofits. Total
giving (the sum of direct cash, foundation cash, and non-cash contributions) from 95
private companies decreased by 5% from 2006 to 2008 and increased 7% from 2008 to
2009 (Rose, 2010, p. 12). Changes in non-cash contributions mostly drove the changes in
total contributions from private companies. Non-cash contributions decreased by
approximately 8% from 2006 to 2008 and increased by about 16% from 2008 to 2009.
Cash contributions marginally decreased from 2007 to 2009. Other researchers have also
concluded that there was an increase in charitable contributions from private companies
during the 2008 recession (Brewster, 2008; Urriolagoitia & Vernis, 2012). Corporate
contributions may also shift to different nonprofit subsectors during a recession.
According to Cohen (2009), corporate philanthropists strategically gave more to the areas
closely related to their businesses, such as community development, public image, brand
awareness, and consumer allegiance. However, they reduced contributions to certain
fields such as the arts and culture, nonprofit housing, and community development
nonprofits.
Lastly, economic recessions can also affect the support from government,
resulting in changes to nonprofit funding restrictions, for example. Carlson et al. (2010)
found that the 2000-2002 recession expedited performance-measurement reform in
Oregon, which affected the eligibility of nonprofit organizations for financial benefits.
Due to the 2000-2002 economic recession, Oregon’s general budget of $14 billion was
cut by around $2 billion. As a result, the Oregon legislature required the Oregon Progress
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Board to develop performance-measurement guidelines that required nonprofit
organizations to meet statewide goals. These expanded and intensified performancerelated restrictions caused drastic change in funding sources for nonprofits in the state.
This example from Oregon suggests nonprofits’ support from governments may decrease
during recessions.
Responses of Nonprofits to Economic Recession
In addition to the change in nonprofit revenue sources, the recession influenced
the financial behavior of nonprofit organizations. Calabrese (2012) concludes that
nonprofit organizations reserved unrestricted net assets, rather than restricted assets,
during the recession period. In general, nonprofit organizations retain unrestricted net
assets to protect themselves against financial vulnerability. For example, the health and
housing subsector tends to maintain its unrestricted net assets to pay debts, or they are
required to have a certain unrestricted net asset balance as a reserve, rather than having
leverage. However, nonprofit organizations in the education subsector reduce unrestricted
net assets faster than leverage is acquired. This may indicate that leverage is a cheaper
financing source for nonprofit organizations in the education sector. Although the
reaction of nonprofit organizations toward financial shock varies by subsector, nonprofits
generally increase unrestricted net asset accumulations to decrease their financial
vulnerability.
Prentice (2015) also stresses the importance of liquidity reserves in responding to
financial shocks. He used variables such as the ratio of working capital (the difference
between current assets and the sum of liability and restricted net assets) to total assets and
months of spending (the number of months an organization could survive after losing all
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current income and maintaining its spending on operations at a constant level) (Bowman,
2011, p. 179). Previous research has found that these variables are negatively related to
financial vulnerability (Bowman, 2011; Keating et al., 2005; Prentice, 2015). The more
liquidity nonprofit organizations have, the less financially vulnerable they are.
Regarding fixed and unfixed revenue sources, the earned income and assets of
nonprofit organizations can be important variables to use in measuring the influence of a
recession. Many studies have shown that income and asset levels are negatively related to
financial vulnerability, whereas the ratio of net income to total assets is positively related
to financial vulnerability (Bowman, 2011; Keating et al., 2005). In other words,
organizations with larger asset reserves and smaller net incomes and revenues are less
vulnerable to financial shocks, whereas nonprofit organizations with smaller asset
reserves and larger net incomes and revenues are more vulnerable to financial shocks
(Prentice, 2015).
Specific types of revenue sources can make nonprofit organizations vulnerable to
economic downturns (Carroll & Stater, 2009; Grønbjerg, 1993; Kingma, 1993). For
example, nonprofit organizations that receive more than half of their funding from
donations and contributions experience higher revenue volatility than those that rely more
on commercial revenue (Carrol & Stater, 2009; Keating et al., 2005; Prentice, 2015). This
is because contributions and donations are sporadic and heavily dependent on economic
and political conditions (Keating et al., 2005).
In addition to the types of revenue sources, the diversity of revenue sources is also
an important factor that influences financial vulnerability and revenue volatility. In
general, nonprofit organizations with few revenue sources are more vulnerable to
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economic recession than those with diverse revenue sources (Calabrese, 2011; Carroll &
Stater, 2009, Frumkin & Keating, 2002; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Hager, 2001; Keating
et al., 2005; Trussel et al., 2002; Tuckman & Chang, 1991).
Hypotheses and Variable Specification
Previous studies focus on the impact of economic recessions on nonprofit
revenues. However, few studies have explored the impact of nonprofit size (Saxton &
Benson, 2005; Grønbjerg & Paarlberg, 2001). For the state and public, it may be more
important whether the role of nonprofits is shrinking or not during the economic
recession. For instance, the state could find that the nonprofit sector grows more even
though their revenue fluctuates from the economic recession. As long as nonprofits play
their role as the producers of social value, the state could make decisions on supporting
the nonprofit sector to keep them producing social benefits.
To examine the factors that influence the size of the U.S. nonprofit sector during
economic recessions, I test the following two hypotheses:
H1. The 2000–2002 economic crisis reduced the change in the number of
nonprofits;
H2. The 2007–2008 Great Recession reduced the change in the number of
nonprofits.
This will be accomplished by examining various studies that have focused on the impact
of the economic crises on the nonprofit sector from the following four perspectives:
nonprofit finance, nonprofit organization, state demographics, and state characteristics.
Figure 5 illustrates the research framework.
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Figure 5. Research framework
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, I explore factors affecting the growth rate of the
number of nonprofits. The dependent variable of this model is the change in the number
of nonprofits. Explanatory variables are classified into three different categories: state
characteristics, nonprofit finance and organization, and state demographic characteristics.
State characteristics include variables such as citizen ideology, government ideology,
governing party, legislative control, and volunteer rate (Berry et al., 1998 & 2010).
Nonprofit finance and organization includes variables such as average revenues,
functional expenses, liabilities, and net assets. Demographic characteristics include state
gross product, poverty rates, percentages of white and black population, percentages of
the population over 65 years old, and college graduation rates (Bielefeld, 2000; Bielefeld
et al., 1997).
Model Specification and Data
The present objective is to investigate the number of nonprofit organizations at
the state level to clarify which state factors mitigate or intensify the influence of an
economic recession on the nonprofit sector. To address this question empirically, a
pooled ordinary least squares regression model is applied to analyze data from multiple
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observations of 50 states over the period 2000–2012 The present study focuses on
nonprofits that filed a Form 990 from 2000 to 2011 and reported gross receipts greater
than or equal to $200,000 or total assets greater than or equal to $500,000 at the end of
the tax year. Because the standards used to file Form 990 changed multiple times
between 2000 and 2011, this study adopts the strictest standard (2010) for consistency.
The data cleaning follows the rule suggested by Bowman, Tuckman, and Young (2012).
Empirical Results
Descriptive Findings
Table 16 provides the descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analysis.
The total number of observations is 600, covering 50 states over 12 years from 2000 to
2011. Each state has 15,460 nonprofits on average. Each nonprofit earned on average
around $71 million and spent around $66.2 million on functional expenses. An average of
around 30% of a state’s population tends to participate in volunteer activities, spending
around 38 hours on average per year on these activities (Cooperation for National
Community Service, 2015).
Table 16 Selective Descriptive statistics
Variables
Obs Mean
Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of NPOs
600 15,460.17 17,458.98
750 88,700
Citizen ideology (Con→Lib)*
600
51.824
15.897 8.450 95.972
Volunteer rate (%)
600
0.300
0.066 0.085
0.558
Volunteer hour (hour)
600
38.543
14.168
0 137.400
Nonprofit Revenue (million$)
600
71.0
25.6 17.9
246.0
Nonprofit Functional
Expense(million$)
600
66.2
23.1 16.0
141.0
Nonprofit Liability (million$)
600
59.3
36.4 10.6
258.0
Nonprofit Net Assets (million$)
600
81.5
36.7 29.0
273.0
* Citizen ideology was measured on a scale of 1 to 100, in which 1 represents an
extremely conservative ideology, and 100 represents an extremely liberal ideology’.
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Estimation Results
Model 1 in Table 17 shows that the 2000-2002 stock market downturn and the
2007-2008 financial crisis affected the number of nonprofit organizations slightly
differently. First, the change in nonprofit size, measured by the number of nonprofits,
decreased from 2003 to 2011 compared to 2000. The 2000–2002 economic crisis did not
reduce the number of nonprofits immediately. However, the impact of the 2000–2002
economic crisis continued from 2003 to 2005. In 2003, the nonprofit size decreased
around 32% from the previous year. Nonprofit size decreased slightly in 2004 and 2005,
5% and 4% respectively. On the other hand, during the 2007 Great Recession period,
nonprofit size greatly decreased around 10% in 2007 but recovered quickly in 2008 and
2009. Nonprofit size increased around 1% in 2008 and 35% in 2009, compared to
previous years. After the recession, the nonprofit size decreased again in 2010 and 2011,
6% and 7% respectively.
Models 2 and 3 also show similar trends with the full model. The 2000–2002
economic crisis did not immediately reduce the number of nonprofit organizations during
the recession period in 2001 and 2002. Rather, nonprofit size was significantly reduced in
2003. The decrease in nonprofit size continued until 2005. On the other hand, the 2007–
2008 Great Recession hit the nonprofit sector immediately in 2007 but the sector grew
immediately in 2008 and 2009. Unlike the full model, Model 3 shows the increases in
nonprofit size in 2010 and 2011 are not statistically significant.
In addition, Models 1, 2, and 3 consistently show that the influence of the
economic crisis on nonprofit size can be mitigated in states with the following
characteristics: more state spending, more liberal citizen ideology, higher volunteer rate,
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lower volunteer hours, higher net asset of nonprofit organizations, higher state gross
product, lower unemployment rate, and more white and age above 65 population.
Table 17 Economic Crisis and the Number of Nonprofit Organizations
Dependent Variable

Model 1
(Full)

Model 2
(2000−2005)
β
t

ln(Number of NPOs)
β
t
Year
2001
−.073
−1.79
−.025
0.26
2002
.026
0.02
.094*
2.74
2003
−.295 ***
−7.77
−.232*** −0.26
2004
−.347 ***
−9.33
−.287*** −1.97
2005
−.385 ***
−9.97
−.328*** −1.97
2006
−.373 *** −10.15
2007
−.475 *** −13.71
2008
−.469 *** −15.01
2009
−.120 *
−7.04
**
2010
−.182
−7.53
2011
−.248 ***
−8.82
State Characteristics
ln(State spending)
.281 ***
7.77
.363***
7.00
Citizen ideology (Con→Lib)
.012 ***
12.63
.010***
6.34
Volunteer rate (%)
.795 ***
2.54
.837**
1.32
***
Volunteer hour (hour)
−.005
−5.90
−.004***
Nonprofit Finance ($2011)
ln(Average revenue)
−.081
−0.40
.163
1.43
ln(Average functional expense)
−.098
−0.71
−.304
−2.72
ln(Average liability)
.044
1.28
−.075*
−0.65
ln(Average net asset)
.192 ***
3.26
.189*** −1.95
Demographic Characteristics
State Gross Product (ln)1
.795 ***
14.60
.726***
7.36
Unemployment rate (%)2
−.054 ***
−6.94
−.085*** −7.32
Poverty rate (%)
.004
3.08
−.001
−0.04
White population (%)
1.045 ***
14.43
.966***
9.86
Black population (%)
.215
0.54
.236
Age over 65 (%)
.538 ***
3.41
.450***
3.73
College graduation rate (%)
.005
2.05
.006
1.27
Constant
−6.623
−5.885
N
600
300
P>F
.000
.000
R2
.960
.969
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Note: Reference year 2000 for Model 1 & 2; Reference year 2006 for Model 3

1

Model 3
(2006−2011)
β
t

−
−.105 **
−.097 ***
.141 **
.077
−.008

−
−4.16
−6.97
0.20
−0.05
−1.39

.153 **
.012 ***
2.522 ***
−.008 ***

3.74
10.50
2.29
−4.06

−.199
076
−.084 **
.162 ***

−0.81
−0.01
−0.12
2.36

.153 **
−.037 ***
.009
.767 ***
.379 **
5.791 ***
.007
−6.970
300
.000
.958

12.48
−5.24
2.84
10.29
1.12
3.22
1.57

State Gross Product (SGP) ($million 2011)
Extrapolation of the missing variable for 2000 and 2001 using backward forecasting with Moving
Average 3 (MA3)
2
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Discussion
This chapter investigates the impact of two major recessions on nonprofit size,
occurring between the years 2000 and 2012: in the years 2000–2002 and 2007–2009. The
2000-2002 stock market downturn did not affect the nonprofit sector immediately,
however, nonprofits continued to struggle after the recession period. One explanation
could be that nonprofits took time to adjust to the domestic market changes to the growth
of internet and information technology. Also, the continued domestic issues like
September 11th attacks or stock market downturns could cause nonprofit size to continue
decreasing.
On the other hand, the Great Recession in 2007 and 2008 did decrease the
nonprofit size immediately in 2007, the largest drop in the 2000s. However, nonprofits
recovered quickly in 2008 and 2009. The Great Recession in 2007 and 2008 was initiated
by the mortgage-based bubble. This recession was related to the moral hazard of lending
and exacerbated by the increased connectivity of global financial market. In that sense,
the impact of the Great Recession in 2007 and 2008 was extremely large on the loanbased market, like real estate, securities, and stocks. The nonprofit sector immediately
shrunk by the shocks of financial illiquidity in the market. The nonprofit sector grew
more in 2008 and 2009 since the nonprofits usually do not rely on real estate assets. Also,
nonprofits could provide more support for people who lost their housing during the Great
Recession.
In addition to the impact of economic downturns, the state buffering effect could
mitigate the decrease in nonprofit size. For instance, a high state volunteer rate increases
nonprofit size significantly. According to Twombly (2003), the two main factors related
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to the increase of nonprofit organizations are regional culture and organizational density.
He found that nonprofit organizations in regions with more moralistic and traditional
cultures have higher entry rates than those in regions with more individualistic cultures.
The higher volunteer rate could reflect the more group-oriented and participatory culture,
which can lead to an increase in nonprofit size. Lastly, the financial security of the state
government and nonprofits affect the size of nonprofits according to nonprofit finance
factors and state demographic factors.
The empirical results can contribute to the study of nonprofit market risk and
explain the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of responding to an
economic crisis. For future research, individual organizational level data could be used
for more precise and specific information instead of aggregated state analysis.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to test whether different subsectors of nonprofit
organizations react differently to an economic crisis.
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Chapter Five. Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Future Directions
This dissertation, titled “Three Essays on Financial Collaboration in the
Government and Nonprofit Sectors,” aims to explore the internal and external financial
risks that nonprofit organizations need to manage to sustain long-term growth. These
topics are multidisciplinary studies that apply theoretical concepts from corporate
finance, public administration, and management into nonprofit study. Nonprofit financial
strategy and revenue management are important considerations as nonprofits have
different financial perspectives than for-profit organizations.
First, it is necessary to apply advanced corporate finance strategies with caution
as the nonprofit sector has increasingly competed with the private sector, which has used
advanced finance and risk management strategies for many years. Chapter 2 investigates
the impact of catastrophic revenue loss on the nonprofit sector and portfolio revenue
strategy. The results indicate that portfolio revenue strategies decrease the chances of
catastrophic revenue loss. For instance, nonprofits with revenue sets that have negative
correlations among those revenue sources can theoretically reduce the probability of
nonprofits losing their revenues in a worst-case scenario.
This result can contribute to the literature on nonprofit finance risk management by
applying corporate finance theory-driven measurement to the nonprofit sector. It can also
help nonprofit financial managers consider their revenue portfolio to reduce extreme
revenue risk. The major feature of a well-developed portfolio is the correlation among the
revenue sources; therefore, it is important to analyze the determinants of the correlations,
ideally discussing the negative revenue correlations to minimize the portfolio variance, in
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future research. Also, regarding value-at-risk, further study can explore why certain
nonprofit subsectors are better at adjusting extreme revenue loss than others.
Second, even though government support is generally known to be a stable and
secure source of revenue for nonprofits, underpayments or late payments can place
nonprofits in financially difficult conditions. For these reasons, studying changes in
government grants awarded to nonprofits can provide useful information. Additionally, as
government grants are becoming a more significant part of nonprofits’ revenues in terms
of maintaining financial security and mission-oriented objectives, an exploration of the
understudied topic of state and local government grants awarded to nonprofits is in
demanded. Chapter 3 explores the state determinants that influence the amount of state
and local government funding that is awarded to nonprofits. Results show that state
government expenditures, and economic and demographic factors influence the state and
local government contributions to nonprofits. For instance, nonprofits tend to receive
more state and local government grants when they are located in states with fewer
expenditures. This result implies that state governments utilize nonprofits as a
supplementary provider of public services.
In addition, state and local governments make contributions to nonprofits when the
state has more resources (e.g., lower unemployment rate) or higher demands (e.g., greater
population over 65 years old). Nonprofits that have diversified revenue sources and
higher membership income also tend to receive more state and local government grants.
This result can contribute to the literature on the budgetary relationship between state
governments and nonprofits as well as nonprofit revenue management. It also suggests
that nonprofit managers may consider state characteristics in order to improve their
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financial connections with state and local governments. State and local governments can
also create the environments for utilizing nonprofits to supplement or complement the
provision of state and local government services. It would be fruitful to pursue further
research using more detailed, within-state information about government contributions to
nonprofits. This further study can improve identification of the impact of state finance on
the nonprofits.
Finally, the ability to successfully manage unexpected external shocks is crucial
to the survival of the nonprofit sector. An examination of market risk management will
be helpful to explain the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector in terms of its
response to an economic crisis. Chapter 4 studies the impact of economic recessions on
nonprofits between the years 2000 and 2012, especially between 2000-2002 and 20072008. The 2000-2002 recession had a delayed impact, whereas the 2008-2009 recession
had an immediate impact on the nonprofit sector. This result implies that the size of the
nonprofit sector could respond differently depending on the change in markets. In
addition, the impact of the economic crisis on nonprofit size can be mitigated or
intensified, depending on the characteristics of the state and its nonprofits. This result can
contribute to the literature on nonprofit risk management as well as reinforce the
importance of a state’s characteristics. For future study, the nonprofit size can be
measured with the nonprofits’ expenditures rather than the number of nonprofits.
Nonprofit expenditures, however, can be driven by their revenue; it is important to
carefully analyze the feedback loop between expenditures and revenue.
In sum, this dissertation holistically analyzes nonprofit internal and external
financial management. To improve internal financial security, nonprofit organizations
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can develop well-fitted revenue portfolios considering the interrelation among revenue
sources. To improve external financial security, nonprofits can consider the political,
economic, and demographic characteristics of their environments. Lastly, nonprofits may
need to focus on the impact of economic change since their revenue streams can fluctuate
depending on the changes in market.
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Appendix A: Chapter 4 Economic Crisis and the Spending of the Nonprofit Organizations
Nongovernmental
Program Service
Other Revenue
Dependent Variable
Expense
Government Grant
Grant
Revenue
β
z
β
z
β
z
β
z
β
z
Year
2002
−.007
−0.59 −.080
−1.37
.056
0.41 −.001
−0.10 −.116
−1.49
2003
.196 *** 11.57
.013
0.22
.088
0.60
.194 ***
9.48
.292 ***
3.59
2004
−.025 ** −2.02 −.083
−1.38
.044
0.31 −.020
−1.26 −.096
−1.20
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Nonprofit Finance
($2011)
ln(Average
functional expense)
ln(Average
governmental grants)
ln(Average
nongovernmental
grants)
ln(Average program
service revenue)
ln(Average other
revenue)
Lagged dependent
variable
Nonprofit
Organization

−.019

−1.61

−.037 *** −2.99
.078 ***
5.99
.089 ***
5.86
−.117 *** −6.24
.019
1.10
−.054 *** −3.07

.015

***

−.113 *

−1.89

−.008

−.158 ***
−.060
−.183
−.183 **
−.140 **
−.211 ***

−2.65
−0.97
−0.32
−2.59
−1.97
−2.94

.030
−.054
−.069
−.077
.060
−.031

−0.06
0.21
−0.38
−0.39
−0.40
0.29
−0.16

.491 *

1.83

−.714

−0.97

−.021

−0.27

2.66

−.024
−.037
.056
.072
−.086
.039
−.058

**
***
***
***
**
***

.301 ***
−.021 ***

−1.53

−.049

−0.61

−2.39
3.41
3.51
−4.59
2.05
−3.03

−.074
−.055
−.375 ***
−.140
−.083
−.182 *

−0.94
−0.67
−4.06
−1.54
−0.90
−1.93

4.81

.243

0.65

−3.09

.025

0.65

1.71

−.100

−0.76

−.035

−0.11

.051 *
.003
.116
.013
.795

***
*
***

0.15

−.120

2.68

−.514 **

0.28

.233

0.38

1.78

.010

−1.95

.086

0.99

.873 ***

32.29

.079 **

2.07

16.66

−2.39

83

.000
.697 ***

0.04
15.77

.716

***

Average number of
employees
ln(Average liability)
($2011)
ln(Average net asset)
($2011)
Demographic
Characteristics
Population density
(mi2)
Unemployment rate
(%)
Poverty rate (%)
White population
(%)
Black population
(%)
Age over 65 (%)
State Characteristics
Citizen ideology
(Con→Lib)
Government
ideology
Governor party (Rep
= 1)
Legislative control
(Rep = 1)
ln(State spending)
($2011)
State Gross Product
(ln)3
3

.000

***

−.000
.004

4.72

.001 **

2.16

.001

1.30

−.012

−0.16

−.147

−1.36

−.000

−0.44
*

.000 ***

−.003

1.86
−2.02

−.015

−0.68

−.031

−0.66

−.059

−0.15

−.031

−0.80

−.068

−0.16

.001

1.13

−.000

−0.16

.002

0.04

−.023

−0.60

.046 **

.000

0.37

−0.70

.000

0.10

.015

0.61

−0.15

−.002 **

.458 *

3.90

1.84

.007 ***

3.08

.119 **

2.47

.002
−.007
−.025
.013

1.52
−0.23
−0.56
0.27

2.01

State Gross Product (SGP) ($million 2011)
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−.002

−0.35

Volunteer rate (%)
GINI
Constant
1.133
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Note: Reference year 2001; Lag year 2000

.692
2.115
20.745

3.246

1.14
1.06
−.515

1.196

Using functional expenses as the size of nonprofits, the results shows that the influence of economic crisis can be mitigated in
states with the following characteristics: more nonprofit organizations with government grants, program service revenue, and other
revenue (rent income or investment income), higher unemployment rate, and a larger number of employees in the nonprofit
organizations. Since revenue and expenses in the nonprofit sector simultaneously influence each other, this research applies the
simultaneous analysis model with five equations.
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝑥
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑦
where revenue = government grants + non-governmental grants + program service revenue + other revenue.
1. Spending = government grants + non-governmental grants + program service revenue + other revenue + x
2. Government grants = spending + y1 + z1 (non-governmental grants, program service revenue, other revenue)
3. Non-governmental grants = spending + y2 + z2 (government grants, program service revenue, other revenue)
4. Program service revenue = spending + y3 + z3 (government grants, non-governmental grants, other revenue)
5. Other revenue = spending + y4 + z4 (government grants, non-governmental grants, program revenue)

85

References

Acerbi, C., & Tasche, D. (2002). Expected shortfall: A natural coherent alternative to
value at risk. Economic Notes, 31(2), 379–388. Retrieved from
http://prx.library.gatech.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?di
rect=true&db=bth&AN=6832302&site=eds-live&scope=site
Acharya, V. V., Almeida, H., & Campello, M. (2007). Is cash negative debt? A hedging
perspective on corporate financial policies. Journal of Financial Intermediation,
16(4), 515–554. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2007.04.001
Alves, I. F., & Neves, C. (2016). Extreme value theory: An introductory overview. In F.
Longin (Ed.), Extreme events in finance: A handbook of extreme value theory and
its applications (pp. 53–95). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
doi:10.1002/9781118650318.ch4
Andreoni, J., & Payne, A. A. (2011). Crowding-out charitable contributions in Canada:
New knowledge from the North. National Bureau of Economic Research, 17635.
doi:10.3386/w17635
Anheier, H. K. (2005). Nonprofit organizations: Theory, management, policy. New York,
NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Ashley, S. R., & Van Slyke, D. M. (2012). The influence of administrative cost ratios on
state government grant allocations to nonprofits. Public Administration Review,
72(1), S47–S56.
Beam, D. R., & Conlan, T. J. (2002). Grants. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The tools of
government: A guide to the new governance (pp. 340–380). New York, NY:
86

Oxford University Press.
Bennett, R. (2012). Why urban poor donate: A study of low-income charitable giving in
London. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41(5), 870-891.
doi:10.1177/0899764011419518
Berlin, L. (2008). Lessons of Survival, From the Dot-Com Attic. New York Times
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23proto.html
Berry, W. D., Fording, R. C., Ringquist, E. J., Hanson, R. L., & Klarner, C. (2010).
Measuring citizen and government ideology in the American states: A reappraisal. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 10, 117–135.
Berry, W. D., Ringquist, E. J., Fording, R. C., & Hanson, R. L. (1998). Measuring citizen
and government ideology in the American states, 1960–93. American Journal of
Political Science, 42, 327–348.
Bielefeld, W. (2000). Metropolitan nonprofit sectors: Findings from NCCS data.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(2), 297-314. Retrieved from
http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/29/2/297.full.pdf
Bielefeld, W., Murdoch, J.C., & Waddell, P. (1997). The influence of demographics and
distance on nonprofit location. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 26(6),
207-25. Retrieved from http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/26/2/207.full.pdf
Blinder, A. S. (2015). What Did We Learn from the Financial Crisis, the Great
Recession, and the Pathetic Recovery? Journal of Economic Education, 46(2),
135-149. doi:10.1080/00220485.2015.1015190
Boris, E. T., & Steuerle, C. E. (2006). Nonprofits and government: Collaboration and
conflict. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.

87

Bowman, W. (2002). The Uniqueness of Nonprofit Finance and the Decision to Borrow.
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 12(3), 293-311.
doi:doi:10.1002/nml.12306
Bowman, W. (2011). Accounting: Measuring past performance. In W. Bowman (Ed.),
Finance fundamentals for nonprofits: Building capacity and sustainability.
Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Bowman, W. (2011). Finance fundamentals of nonprofits: Building capacity and
sustainability. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Bowman, W., Tuckman, H. P., & Young, D. R. (2012). Issues in nonprofit finance
research surplus, endowment, and endowment portfolios. Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 41(4), 560–579.
Bremner, R. H. (1988). American philanthropy (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Brewster, D. (2008, March 6). Slowdown fails to dent U.S. corporate charity. Financial
Times.
Brown, W. A., Hillman, A. J., & Okun, M. A. (2012). Factors that influence monitoring
and resource provision among nonprofit board members. Nonprofit and voluntary
sector quarterly, 41(1), 145-156. Retrieved from
http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/41/1/145.full.pdf
Brown, B. G., & Katz, R. W. (1995). Regional analysis of temperature extremes: Spatial
analog for climate change? Journal of Climate, 8(1), 108–119. doi:10.1175/15200442(1995)008<0108:raotes>2.0.co;2
Butler, J. S., & Schachter, B. (1996). Improving value-at-risk estimates by combining
88

kernel estimation with historical simulation. Paper presented at the Fed Bank
Structure Conference, Chicago, USA. Retrieved from
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.4714&rep=rep1&t
ype=pdf
Cade, B. S., & Noon, B. R. (2003). A gentle introduction to quantile regression for
ecologists. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 1(8), 412–420.
doi:10.2307/3868138
Calabrese, T. D. (2012). The accumulation of nonprofit profits: A dynamic analysis.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41(2), 300–324.
doi:10.1177/0899764011404080
Calabrese, T. (2011). Testing competing capital structure theories of nonprofit
organizations. Public Budgeting & Finance, 31(3), 119–143.
Cannon, S. M., & Donnelly-Cox, G. (2015). Surviving the peace: Organizational
responses to deinstitutionalization of Irish peacebuilding. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 44(2), 360-378. doi:10.1177/0899764013517051
Carlson, J., Kelley, A. S., & Smith, K. (2010). Government performance reforms and
nonprofit human services: 20 years in Oregon. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly, 39(4), 630-652. doi:10.1177/0899764009360824
Carroll, D., & Stater, K. (2009). Revenue diversification in nonprofit organizations: Does
it lead to financial stability? Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 19(4), 947–966. Retrieved from http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org
/content/19/4/947.full.pdf
Chang, C. F., & Tuckman, H. P. (1994). Revenue diversification among non-profits.
89

Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 5(3),
273–290. doi:10.1007/bf02354036
Chikoto, G. L., & Neely, D. G. (2014). Building nonprofit financial capacity: The impact
of revenue concentration and overhead costs. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly, 43(3), 570–588. doi:10.1177/0899764012474120
Choudhry, M., & Wong, M. (2013). An introduction to value-at-risk. Chichester, UK:
Wiley.
Cohen, R. (2009). How corporate giving will fare in this recession. The Cohen Report: A
Web Publication by the Nonprofit Quarterly. Retrieved from
http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/ cohenreport/2009/03/19/how-corporategiving-will-fare-in-this-recession.
Cooperation for National Community Service. (2015). Volunteering and civic life in
America. Retrieved from https://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov
/rankings/Large-Cities/Volunteer-Hours-per-Resident/2014
Crone, T. M., & Clayton-Matthews, A. (2005). Consistent economic indexes for the 50
states. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 593–603.
Davino, C., Furno, M., & Vistocco, D. (2014). Quantile regression: Theory and
applications. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
De Hoyos, R. E., & Sarafidis, V. (2006). Testing for cross-sectional dependence in paneldata models. Stata Journal, 6(4), 482–496.
Diamond, S. (2002). Efficiency and Benevolence: Philanthropic Tax Exemptions in 19thCentury America. In E. Brody (Ed.), Property-tax Exemption for Charities:
Mapping the Battlefield (pp. 115-144): Urban Institute Press.

90

DiMaggio, P. J. (1987). Nonprofit enterprise in the arts: Studies in mission and
constraint. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Driscoll, J. C., & Kraay, A. C. (1998). Consistent covariance matrix estimation with
spatially dependent panel data. Review of Economics and Statistics, 80, 549–560.
Fabozzi, F. J. (2012). Encyclopedia of financial models (Vol. 1). Hoboken, NJ: John
Wiley & Sons.
Froelich, K. A. (1999). Diversification of revenue strategies: Evolving resource
dependence in nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
28(3), 246–268. doi:10.1177/0899764099283002
Frumkin, P., & Keating, E. (2002). The risks and rewards of nonprofit revenue
concentration (Harvard University Faculty Research Working Paper Series).
Cambridge, MA: Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations.
Frumkin, P., & Keating, E. K. (2011). Diversification reconsidered: The risks and
rewards of revenue concentration. Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 2(2), 151–
164. doi:10.1080/19420676.2011.614630.
Gamm, G., & Putnam, R. D. (1999). The growth of voluntary associations in America,
1840–1940. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 29(4), 511–557.
Gazley, B. (2008). Beyond the contract: The Scope and Nature of Informal GovernmentNonprofit Partnerships. Public Administration Review, 68(1), 141–54.
Gittell, R., & Tebaldi, E. (2006). Charitable giving: Factors influencing giving in U.S.
states. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35(4), 721–736.
doi:10.1177/0899764006289768
Glassman, J. K. (2015). 3 Lessons for Investors From the Tech Bubble. Kiplinger's

91

Personal Finance. Retrieved from https://www.nasdaq.com/article/3-lessons-forinvestors-from-the-tech-bubble-cm443106
Goldfarb, B., Kirsch, D., & Miller, D. A. (2007). Was there too little entry during the Dot
Com Era? Journal of financial economics, 86(1), 100-144.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.009
Greene, W. H. (2010). Econometric analysis (Vol. 7). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Greenlee, J., & Trussel, J. (2000). Estimating the financial vulnerability of charitable
organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 11(2), 199–210.
Grønbjerg, K. (1993). Understanding nonprofit funding: Managing revenues in social
service community development organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Grønbjerg, K. A., & Paarlberg, L. (2001). Community variations in the size and scope of
the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30(4), 684-706.
Retrieved from http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/30/4/684.full.pdf
Hager, M. (2001). Financial vulnerability among arts organizations: A Ttest of Tuckman–
Chang measures. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30(2), 376–392.
Retrieved from http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/30/2/376.full.pdf
Hall, P. D. (2006). A historical overview of philanthropy, voluntary associations, and
nonprofit organizations in the United States, 1600–2000. In W. W. Powell & R.
Steinberg (Eds.), The nonprofit sector: A research handbook. New Haven &
London: Yale University Press.
Hall, P. D. (2010). Historical perspectives on nonprofit organizations in the United
States. In D. O. Renz & R. D. Herman (Eds.), The Jossey-Bass handbook of

92

nonprofit leadership and management. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.
Hansmann, H. (1987). Economic theories of nonprofit organization. In W. W. Powell
(Ed.), The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (Vol. 1, pp. 27–42).
Haslwanter, T. (2016). An introduction to statistics with Python: With applications in the
life sciences. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
Herfindahl, O. C. (1951). Concentration in the steel industry. University Microfilms, Ann
Arbor, MI. Retrieved from http://www.worldcat.org/title/concentration-in-thesteel-industry/oclc/836309166
Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional
dependence. The Stata Journal, 7(3), 281–312.
Hosking, J. R. M., & Wallis, J. R. (1987). Parameter and quantile estimation for the
generalized pareto distribution. Technometrics, 29(3), 339–349. Retrieved from
http://prx.library.gatech.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?di
rect=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.10.2307.1269343&site=eds-live&scope=site
Internal Revenue Service. (2015). SOI tax stats: Annual extract of tax-exempt
organization financial data. Retrieved from http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-TaxStats-Annual-Extract-of-Tax-Exempt-Organization-Financial-Data.
Jegers, M. (1997). Portfolio theory and nonprofit financial stability: A comment and
extension. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 26(1), 65–72.
doi:10.1177/0899764097261006
Joassart-Marcelli, P., & Wolch, J. R. (2003). The intrametropolitan geography of poverty
and the nonprofit sector in southern California. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector

93

Quarterly, 32(1), 70-96. Retrieved from
http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/32/1/70.full.pdf
Jorion, P. (2001). Value at risk: The new benchmark for managing financial risk. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Keating, E., Fischer, M., Gordon, T., & Greenlee, J. (2005). Assessing Financial
Vulnerability in the Nonprofit sector (Harvard University Faculty Research
Working Paper Series No. 27). Cambridge, MA: Hauser Center for Nonprofit
Organizations.
Kemp, M. (2011). Extreme events—Robust portfolio construction in the presence of fat
tails. Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Kingma, B. R. (1993). Portfolio theory and nonprofit financial stability. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22(2), 105–119.
Klarner, Carl. (2013). Governors dataset. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1
/20408, Harvard Dataverse, V1.
Kramer, Ralph M. (1981). Voluntary agencies in the welfare state. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Lam, M., & McDougle, L. (2015). Community variation in the financial health of
nonprofit human service organizations: An examination of organizational and
contextual effects. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. Advance online
publication. doi:10.1177/0899764015591365
Lecy, Jesse & Thornton, Jeremy (2016). What Big Data Can Tell Us About Government
Awards to the Nonprofit Sector. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 45(5),
pp.1052-1069

94

Letts, C. W., Ryan, W. P., & Grossman, A. (1999). High performance nonprofit
organizations. New York: John Wiley.
Lincoln, J. R. (1977). The urban distribution of voluntary organizations. Social Science
Quarterly, 58(3), 472–480.
Lipsky, M., & Smith, S. R. (1990). Nonprofit organizations, government, and the welfare
state. Political Science Quarterly, 104, 625–648.
Luksetich, W. (2008). Government funding and nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37(3), 434–442.
Markowitz, H. (1952). Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance, 7(1), 77–91.
doi:10.2307/2975974
Mayer, W. J., Wang, H., Egginton, J. F., & Flint, H. S. (2014). The impact of revenue
diversification on expected revenue and volatility for nonprofit organizations.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43(2), 374–392. Retrieved from
http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/11/18/0899764012464696.full.pdf
McCarthy, K. D. (1994). The history of women in the nonprofit sector: Changing
interpretations. In Odendahl, T. J., O’Neill, M. (Eds.) Women and power in the
nonprofit sector (pp. 17-38). San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass
McKeever, B. S. (2015). The nonprofit sector in brief 2015. Washington D.C.: The Urban
Institute Press.
McMurtry, S. L., Netting, F. E., & Kettner, P. M. (1991). How nonprofits adapt to a
stringent environment. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 1, 235–252.
National Center for Charitable Statistics. (2005). National taxonomy of exempt entities.
Retrieved from http://nccs.urban.org/classification/NTEE.cfm

95

National Council of Nonprofits. (2017). Fast Facts About the Nonprofit Sector Retrieved
from https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/sites/default/files/documents/2017Fast-Facts-About-the-Nonprofit-Sector.pdf
Nikolova, M. (2014). Government funding of private voluntary organizations: Is there a
crowding-out effect? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
0899764013520572. doi:10.1177/0899764013520572
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). (2014). OJJDP FY 2015
VOCA Children’s Advocacy Centers Membership and Accreditation Program.
Retrieved from http://www.ojjdp.gov/grants/solicitations/FY2015/CAC.pdf.
Ostrom, E. (1996). Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development.
World Development, 24(6), 1073–1087.
Porter, N. (2007). Revenue volatility and fiscal risks: An application of value-at-risk
techniques to Hong Kong’s fiscal policy. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,
43(6), 6. Retrieved from
http://prx.library.gatech.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?di
rect=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.27750575&site=eds-live&scope=site
Powell, W. W., & Steinberg, R. (2006). The nonprofit sector: A research handbook. New
Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Prentice, C. R. (2015). Understanding nonprofit financial health: Exploring the effects of
organizational and environmental variables. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly. Advance Online Publication. doi:10.1177/0899764015601243
Probst, G., & Raisch, S. (2005). Organizational crisis: The logic of failure. Academy of
Manage- ment Executive, 19(1), 90-103.

96

Reid, W., & Turbide, J. (2011). Board/staff relationships in a growth crisis: Implications
for nonprofit governance. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41(1), 8299.
Reiss, R. D., & Thomas, M. (2007). Statistical analysis of extreme values: With
applications to insurance, finance, hydrology and other fields. Basel, Switzerland:
Springer.
Rose, A. P. (2010). Giving In Numbers. Retrieved from
http://cecp.co/pdfs/giving_in_numbers/GivinginNumbers2010.pdf
Saidel, J. R. (1991). Resource interdependence: The relationship between public agencies
and nonprofit organizations. Public Administration Review, 51(6), 543–553.
Salamon, L. M. (1987). Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party
Government: Toward a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the
Modern Welfare State. Journal of Voluntary Action Research, 16(1-2), 29-49.
doi:10.1177/089976408701600104
Salamon, L. M. (1995). Partners in public service: Government-nonprofit relations in the
modern welfare state. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Salamon, L. M., & Anheier, H. K. (1997). Defining the nonprofit sector: A cross-national
analysis. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
Sandfort, J. R. (1999). The Structural impediments to front-line human service
collaboration: Examining welfare reform at the front lines. Social Service Review,
13(3), 314–339.
Saxton, G. D., & Benson, M. A. (2005). Social capital and the growth of the nonprofit
sector. Social Science Quarterly, 86(1), 16–35.

97

Seaman, B. A., & Young, D. R. (2010). Handbook of research on nonprofit economics
and management. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Shaw, W. (2007). Refinement of the normal quantile: A benchmark normal quantile
based on recursion, and an appraisal of the Beasley-Springer-Moro, Acklam, and
Wichura (AS241) methods. Retrieved from
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/nms/depts/mathematics/research/finmath/publications/2007
Shaw.pdf
Skocpol, T., Ganz, M., & Munson, Z. (2000). A Nation of organizers: The institutional
origins of civic voluntarism in the United States. American Political Science
Review, 94(3), 527–546.
Smith, S. R., & Lipsky, M. (1993). Nonprofits for hire: The welfare state in the age of
contracting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Stock, J. H., & Watson, M. W. (1989). New indexes of coincident and leading economic
indicators. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 351–394.
Stover, C. (2017). Quantile function. MathWorld—A Wolfram Web Resource, created by
Eric W. Weisstein. Retrieved from
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/QuantileFunction.html
Suzuki, M., & Ozaka, Y. (1994). Seismic risk analysis based on strain energy
accumulation in focal region. Journal of Research of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 99(4), 421–434.
Tarantino, A., & Cernauskas, D. (2010). Essentials of risk management in finance.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Teasdale, S., Kerlin, J., Young, D., & Soh, J. I. (2013). Oil and water rarely mix:

98

Exploring the relative stability of nonprofit revenue mixes over time. Journal of
Social Entrepreneurship, 4(1) 69–97. Retrieved from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19420676.2012.762799
Tobin, J. (1974). What is permanent endowment income? The American Economic
Review, 64(2), 427–432.
Trussel, J., Greenlee, J., & Brady, T. (2002). Predicting financial vulnerability in
charitable organizations. The CPA Journal, 72(6), 66-69.
Tuckman, H., & Chang, C. (1991). A methodology for measuring the financial
vulnerability of charitable nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 20(4), 445–460. doi:10.1177/089976409102000407
Twombly, E. C. (2003). What factors affect the entry and exit of nonprofit human service
organizations in metropolitan areas? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
32(2), 211–235. doi:10.1177/0899764003032002003
Urban Institute, The. (2012). National taxonomy of exempt entities. Retrieved from
http://nccs.urban.org/classification/ntee.cfm
Urriolagoitia, L., & Vernis, A. (2012). May the economic downturn affect corporate
philanthropy? Exploring the contribution trends in Spanish and U.S. companies.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41(5), 759-785.
doi:10.1177/0899764011417719
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2012). Labor force statistics from the current
population survey. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/cps/
U.S. Census Bureau. (2012). Median household income by state - single-year estimates.
Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/topics/income- poverty/income.html
99

U.S. Census Bureau. (2015a). Gini Index of money income and equivalence–adjusted
income: 1967 to 2014. Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/library
/visualizations /2015/demo/gini-index-of-money-income-and-equivalenceadjusted-income--1967.html
U.S. Census Bureau. (2015b). Educational attainment. Retrieved from
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/
U.S. Census Bureau. (2016). Population and housing unit estimates. Retrieved from
http://www.census.gov/popest/
USA Spending. (2016). Federal Assistance Award Data. Retrieved from
https://www.usaspending.gov/DownloadCenter/API/Pages/faads.aspx
Webb, J. C. (2014). The impact of revenue diversification on the financial and
educational outcomes of private colleges and universities during the great
recession (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
Retrieved from
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/107145/jwebbtx_1.pdf?se
quence=1
Weisbrod, B. A., & Dominguez, N. D. (1986). Demand for collective goods in private
markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior?
Journal of Public Economics, 30, 83–95.

Wilhelm, I. (2010, April 22). Great recession generates many new charities. Chronicle of
Philanthropy. Retrieved from http://philanthropy.com/article/Great-RecessionGeneratesMany/65102/

100

Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Yan, W., Denison, D. V., & Butler, J. S. (2009). Revenue structure and nonprofit
borrowing. Public Finance Review, 37(1), 47–67.
Young, D. R. (2000). Alternative models of government-nonprofit sector relations:
theoretical and international perspectives. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly, 29(1), 149-172.
Young, D. R. (2007). Financing nonprofits: Putting theory into practice. Lanham, MD:
AltaMira Press of Rowman & Littlefield.
Young, D. R. (2012). Complementary, supplementary, or adversarial? NonprofitGovernment relations. In E. T. Boris & C. E. Steuerle (Eds.), Nonprofits and
Government: Collaboration and conflict (pp. 37–80). Washington, D.C.: The
Urban Institute Press.

101

April 2018

Vita

SAERIM KIM
EDUCATION
2018 Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) (Expected)
Mrtin School of Public Policy and Administration, University of Kentucky
Dissertation: Three Essays on Financial Collaboration in the Government and Nonprofit Sectors
Committee Members: Dwight Denison, J.S. Butler, Edward Jennings, and Merl Hackbart
2013

Master of Public Policy (MPP)
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University
Major: Nonprofit Policy

2010

Master of Public Administration (MPA)
Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Korea
Thesis Title: The Study of Performance Measurement in Eco-Cities: Focusing on
Environmental Performance Indicators

2009

Bachelor of Public Administration (B.A.)
Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Korea
Summa Cum Laude

FIELD OF INTERESTS
Public Budgeting and Financial Management, Nonprofit Fund Management, and Research Methods
RESEARCH GRANTS
[2] Acceptance and Use of Electronic Payments, The Council of State Governments
2017
Co–Principal Investigators: Dwight Denison and Saerim Kim
Research grant to develop a national report on the acceptance and distribution of electronic
payments by state government
[1] Back On Track, United Way of the Bluegrass, Lexington, Kentucky
Matching grant covering expenses for post-secondary education

2015

AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS
[16]
Best Student Paper Award, Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and
Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), November 2017
[15]
Doctoral Fellowship I, Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary
Action (ARNOVA), November 2017
[14]
Emerging Scholars Award, Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and
Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), November 2016
[13]
Tuition scholarships and graduate stipends, University of Kentucky, 2013–2016
[12]
Graduate School Travel Grant, University of Kentucky, 2013–2016

102

April 2018
[11]
[10]
[9]
[8]
[7]
[6]
[5]
[4]
[3]
[2]
[1]

Daniel R. Reedy Quality Achievement Fellowship Award, University of Kentucky, 2013–
2016
Kentucky Opportunity Fellowship, University of Kentucky, 2013–2014
Tuition scholarships and graduate stipends, Georgia State University, 2011–2013
Pi Alpha Alpha, Honor Society for Public Affairs and Administration, Georgia, 2013
Honorable Mention, Policy Case Competition, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2011
Volunteer Excellence Award, International Conference of System Dynamics, Korea, 2011
Alumni Scholarship for Graduate Students, Sookmyung Foundation, Seoul, Korea, 2010
Early Graduation Excellence Award, Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Korea, 2009
Dean’s Student of the Year, Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Korea, 2009
Merit-based scholarships, Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Korea, 2007–2009
Nok-San Youth Democratic Citizen Leadership Award and Scholarship, Seoul, Korea, 2006

PUBLICATIONS
Manuscripts Under Review
[1]
Kim, S. & Sullivan, A. Collaboration in Housing Services: The Continuum of Care Program
and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.
Peer Reviewed Publications
[3]
Jung, Y., Kim, S, & Lim, T. (2018) Risk Aversion and Sorting into Public Sector: Evidence
from South Korea. Korean Journal of Public Administration, 56(1): 183–211.
[2]
Denison, D. V. & Kim, S. (2018) Linking Practice and Classroom: Nonprofit Financial
Management Curricula in MPA and MPP Programs. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 1–18.
[1]
Kim, D., Hong, Y., & Kim, S. (2009). Sustainability of Transportation and System Thinking:
Slowing Down the Rapidity of Total Entropy. Korean System Dynamics Review, 10(3): 5–23.
Working Papers (*Author order was determined alphabetically)
[5]
Kim, S. Coping with Economic Crisis: The Buffering Capacity of a State for the Nonprofit
Sector. (draft available)
[4]
Kim, S. & Denison, D. V. Revenue Diversification and Downside Risk of Nonprofits:
Applying Extreme Event Theory. (draft available)
[3]
Kim, S. Determinants of State Government Grants to the Nonprofit Sector: Which States’
Nonprofit Organizations Receive Government Grants? (draft available)
[2]
Kim, S., Denison, D. V., & Middleton, D. Government Funding and Lobbying Expenditure
of Charitable Nonprofits. (In preparation)
[1]
*Kim, S. & Sullivan, A. The Impact of Nonprofit Geographic Density on Homeless Services
and Outcomes. (draft available)
Non-Peer Reviewed Publications
[4]
Poister, T. et al (2012). “2012 Employee Survey: Statewide Result.” Georgia Department of
Transportation & Georgia State University Department of Public Administration and Urban
Studies.
[3]
Kim, D., Hong, Y., & Kim, S. (2011). The Limits of the Material World. In Korea System
Dynamics Society and the Seoul Club Research Institute (Eds.), Beyond Broadcasting and
Communication Convergence: A Challenge to a Green Planet and Converging Responses (pp. 20–45).
Seoul: Sunhaksa.
[2]
Kim, D., Hong, Y., & Kim, S. (2010). An Analysis of the Scenario for Future IT Structure
Development in the United States. In Korea System Dynamics Society and the Seoul Club
Research Institute (Eds.), Study of Causal Loop and Simulation of Application and Future Information
Telecommunication in the Unites States. Seoul: Electronics and Telecommunications Research
Institute (ETRI).

103

April 2018
[1]

Kim, D., Hong, Y., & Kim, S. (2009). Diagnostic Research for the National Crisis in Low
Carbon and Green Growth Generation. In Korea System Dynamics Society and the Seoul
Club Research Institute (Eds.), Low Carbon Green Growth and IT 2030 Policy Design Study. Seoul:
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI).

Papers Presented at Academic Conferences
[12]
“Homelessness and Federally Subsidized Housing: The Continuum of Care Program and the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit” Urban Affairs Association (UAA), Toronto, Canada, April
2018
[11]
“The Effect of Grant Recipient Density on Homeless Services and Outcomes” American
Society for Public Administration (ASPA), Denver, March 2018
[10]
“Revenue Diversification and Downside Risk of Nonprofits: Applying Extreme Event
Theory” Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA),
Michigan, November 2017
[9]
“Revenue Diversification and Downside Risk of Nonprofits: Applying Extreme Event
Theory” Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM), Chicago, November
2017
[8]
“Revenue Diversification and Downside Risk of Nonprofits: Applying Extreme Event
Theory” Association for Budgeting and Financial Management (ABFM), Washington, D.C.,
September 2017
[7]
“The Influence of Budgetary Size on State and Federal Government Grant Contributions
between 2000 and 2011” Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action
(ARNOVA), Washington, D.C., November 2016.
[6]
“Determinants of Government Grants for the Nonprofit Sector: Which States’ Nonprofit
Organizations Receive Government Grants?” Association for Public Policy Analysis and
Management (APPAM), Washington, D.C., November 2016.
[5]
“Determinants of Government Grants for the Nonprofit Sector: Which States’ Nonprofit
Organizations Receive Government Grants?” Association for Budgeting and Financial Management
(ABFM), Seattle, WA, October 2016.
[4]
“Public Management Meets Public Economics: An Empirical Investigation of the
Relationship between Government Performance, Citizen Satisfaction, and Property Values.”
Public Management Research Association (PMRC), Aarhus, Denmark, June 2016.
Coauthors: Cole Rakow and Jueyoung Mok.
[3]
“Economic Crises and the Responses of Nonprofit Organizations.” American Society for Public
Administration (ASPA), Seattle, WA, March 2016.
Coauthor: Changguen Yun.
[2]
“State Politics and Government Grants for Nonprofit Organizations in the United States.”
Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), Chicago, IL, April 2015.
[1]
“Elements of Successful Performance Measurement in the Nonprofit Area: A Multiple
Regression Analysis of Nonprofit Performance in the United States.” Southeastern Conference
for Public Administration (SECoPA), Fort Lauderdale, FL, 2012.
MEMBERSHIPS AND AFFILIATIONS
[5]
Urban Affairs Association (UAA)
[4]
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM)
[3]
Association of Budgeting and Financial Management (ABFM)
[2]
Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA)
[1]
American Society for Public Administration (ASPA)
CAMPUS AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
[7]
Graduate Student Board, Quantitative Initiative for Policy and Social Research, University of
Kentucky, 2014–2018

104

April 2018
[6]
[5]
[4]
[3]
[2]
[1]

Nonprofit Leadership Alliance, Alliance Management/Leadership Institute, Georgia, 2011–
2013
National Certified Nonprofit Professional, Nonprofit Leadership Alliance, Georgia, 2013
Grant Writer, Christian Aid Society, Georgia, 2012–2013
Vice President, Korea Graduate Association, Georgia State University, Georgia, 2012–2013
Debater, 6th International Symposium, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan, “East Asia
through the Strait between Japan and Korea,” 2009
Korea-China Youth Leader, Korea Government Youth Commission, Seoul, Korea and
Beijing, China, 2009

ADDITIONAL SKILLS
Quantitative Analysis
Qualitative Analysis
System Dynamics
Social Network Analysis
Languages

Stata, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Geographic
Information System (GIS)
NVivo
Vensim, Stella
UCINET (2016 LINKS Center Network Analysis Workshop)
Korean (native), English (advanced), Chinese & Japanese (basic)

105

